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-2surrounds the issue for the reason that, wherzas on many issues economists can
legitimataly assume that their contribution extends only to measuring impacts of policy
variables on total income and its distribution, when policy may affact the population
size that assumption no longer holds.

Th3 economic component of a society's welfare

is assumed to b:; relateri to in-:::ome per capita

4

and its distribution; when population

is exogenously given, a policy which affacts total income affects income per capita in
the same direction; v1hs:'.'l both economic variables and population are affected by a
given level of techniques per capita income will be lower in a densely populated
country than in a less d3nsely populated one. But technical progr0ss can raise per
capita income in a denseJ.y populated country as readily as in a lsss densely populated
one, even though because of diminishing returns to capital th3 rate or rise, ceteris
paribus, may be somev,hat s~ower. i'liornover, rapid population growth is not a bar, and
perhaps not even u l::'.n-:~::-:.nce, to rapid rise in par capita income. In recent decades,
the rata of rise in per capita incoms has been as high in densely populated countries as
in less densely populated or.es, a:-_::l in countries with rapid population growth as in
countries with slow po~-J~.atio::1 g:-owth,
Th3se c::-;;: soL:;what startling conclusions. .Stated in starkest form, they seem
to say that while initial pop~•J.ation density matters somewhat, the rats of population
grov•1th does not r:::itter 2.t all. Is it really possible that th3 "conventional wisdom" about
population is si.mp).y \·,:s:-ig? ·:r:1at the fear of the consequences of population growth is
based on an un8e.sy t~:~.-:onsc~c'!.1s abrm at an inexorable process, and not on rational
considerations:· 11 (n. ?.f,C')
11
1v;oreov3:, e:;onorr..1.c logic, if not the recent statistics, suggests that
population dsnsi~y does make the task of increase in income somewhat more difficult.
Econom~c logic suggests t!1at, innovational energy and ingenuity and the rate of capital
formation being equal !.n two cot1ntries, the rate of increase in the ft1ore densely pop
ulated co:mtry would be expected to be lower and therefore the "income gap .. between
them wouJ.d be e;Q)ecte1 to increase indefinitely."
Hagen, incicts::1:aHy, p:esents a scatter graph {p. 268) which he feels 0 suggests
neither a positive nor a ns;at::ve co::relation between the growth of per capita output
and population g~o•.tvth." A few far-outriders among these countries leave open the
possibility of a foi:ly s~.g:i.::::icant negativa correlation; much depsnds on how these
outriders are to be i.n::erpre'ted. (p. 270)
4 Or per ad:_,_J.t equivalent or some related measure.
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policy, this is no longer necessarily true and a new and complicati-t,_;._- problem enters
the analysis.

Dmong countries with the same per capita income ( and distribution) J.s

social walfare.:.-assuming that is the variabla to be maximized--greater the larger tha
population·? If the answer to this question is yes, and it would seem logically that
it must be, foen discussions of population policy cannot focus solely on income per
capita {and distribution).

The objective function must also include population, i.e.

social welfare is a positive function of the welfare of each person,so the more people
a country has at a given level of welfare, the higher is total social welfare.
Population policy raises,in a sense, a new problem of int8rpersonal comparisons;
one between people who now exist or who definitely will and others who will or will
not exist according to the policy measures taken.

And it underlines again the nead not

only for a cardinal utility concept ( a necessary but not sufficient condition to permit
any interpersonal comparisons) but also for a concept of zero level utility rather than just
cardinal measurement of utility changes (all that is necessary to permit the inter
personal comparisons necessary in this context of policy measures which do not affect
population} .
Suppose, for example, that a population control policy presents a country
with two alternatives, the second involving a lower population and higher income par
capita than the first.

Clearly if in the first state, (abstracting from questions of

distribution) tha average utility level is zerO'a,. but utility is a positive function of
income, the second state is superior.
negativ,3 utility level in the first state.

The same would be true if averyone were at a
But the choice is more complex if utility is

-4positive in both states.

If social welfare (U) is a positive function of the welfare of

each individu al--W to Wn--and the welfare of the ith individu al is a positive
1
function of ci-k' where ci is the consump tion of the ith individu al and k is
a consump tion level at which utility is zero, then (a) it is ah1ays better
to have more

people than less at a given£ level (c > K)~ (b) whether the social (total)
welfare derivab le from a given nstiona l income is greater with more or less people
depends on whether the margina l utility of income is rising or fallinp in the relevant

range; if it is falling, welfare rises with populati on.
To summari ze, if it may be assumed that the typical person in a society for ;•j ~~~.'
which populati on policy decision s are being made has a positive level of utility, then
the inclusio n as argu:::ents in the objectiv e function of the welfare level of each
individ ual, and the presc~pt ion that social welfare is a positive function of the
welfare of each individu al inplies that social welfare depends both on average welfare
of the individu als and on the nu::iber of people.

Income per caoita is obvious ly an

inappro priate indicato r of social welfare uncer such circums tances, and in fact the
typical situatio ~ might be re?resen ted (see Figure 1) as involvin g a choice between
higher populati o~ end higher income per capita, and therefor e necessi tating indifference curves between these two variable s to make t?:le policy decision .

1

A policy which

At this point we for sirr.plic ity assu.-ne no interrel ationsh ips in consump tion,
i.e., we assume thc.t e=.ch i1";.::1i-:id:1al' s utility is a function only of his own level
of
consump tion, and dio:;.-c 0 a:·d c:.1!:h cc~plex itfos as would result from conside ration of
unequal distribu ~ion of incor.e.

-s-

0

-sincreases both variables clearly dominates a policy which does not.

If the par capita

income lev:l bzlow which utility is n2gativ2 is indicated on the figure by K, the iso
social welfarn curvzs will have a negativ3 slope to the right of this point and a
positive slope to the left of it, as drawn here.

In th3 portion of thz figure to the right

of K, the•~ "indiffarence curves" or iso-welfare curves would be linear if the marginal
product of income is constant and equal for eveI)7one, (or more specifically equal
betwaan existing population and naw population as one moves up and to the left along
the curve); it would i:>e convex down if marginal utility of income is increasing and
concave down in the opposite case.

It may well be that the marginal utility has a more

complicated form; in that case thz iso-welfare curves would have a more complicated
form. 5
,·. e do not pursue here these psycl1ological issues; thz only objective is to
note that the nature of the choice involved in population policy is roughly speaking
that indicated in Figure 1, and that in order to make thz decisions intelligently it is
claarly necessary for someone to have his own subjective judgmants with respect to the
nature of the iso-social welfara curves.
It is useful, before proceeding to narrower issues of population policy., to
categorize briefly some of th2 major threads in the literature on this issue, in terms of

5 This highly oversimplified and stylized version obviously does not take into
account any interactions among people in consumption; it might strik.2 most people
as plausible to assume that with a very low population level something is lost from
~~pfy~

....

'

•

. "Aot_· havin"' .. tlanv peonle to internet TTj_th · this r,~v h~ true. altlloup'1 it Tnust he
!f;ol!J'le ':1.n. riin<I.. .tl-tat the :absence o·f econonies of sc:i] 0 in nroduction _sl,oul(l shm; up
J.~~~·teasure~ i.ncoT"e.-~~:t >eiln'i.ta ·it-Bl:'rf · cconor1ies
sc::r.le in consuT'lntion •·1oul<l

still "1ave to be allm,:rec:1 for.

or

I
!
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how they hav 3 dealt with the isi::ues -~ ~~ r.aj._sP.c. ~.n.rl fo par.t}~ular w:l.'th (:a). the need for
an implicit assu,·11ption as to the levai of income at which, if a n3w person is added to
the population, total social welfare is incraased, and

(h) the e1uestioo.. of

hether

"l-1

marginal utility of income for the representative -p~rson ten<ls to he risinP: or fallin$:!:.
issue here is somewhat .fi.:ln to tbi:>, ,oae.sticn.,cf:- ,i:-v~ther: .tile m~mbers of.. ~ .Jr±.tb country have
responsibility for the welfare of msmbers of poorer countries when e.g. the latter wish
to migrate to th3 richer countries and for som"} r3ason their so doing would lower the
welfare level of the current residents of those countries.

Iv1ost economics pre-

supposes that the obligation of policymakers in a country is e:;.:clusively to maximize
the welfarn of the members of that country, but there is no particular moral or

philosophical basis for such a judgm~nt.

It is rather one of convenience and adequate

description of raality.

In ascending order of what might be callad "completeness of framework" we
distinguish the following types of discussion, none of thGm "wrong" per g

but some

potentially misleading if the conclusions are interpret3d as being complete ones,
something author's frequently do ir,1ply.
1.

P.nalyses of the relationship between {a) size of population or its rate of

growth and {b) per capita income levels and/or the rate of growfo of that variable.

This

sort of analysis is of course a necessary component to any overall judgment on pop
ulation policy, but it is important to remember that it is only a component and not the
full story.

Thus tha empirical studies of this relationship on over time or cross

sectional bas~~ am important.

Those which conclude that a negative correlation

betwean the two variables is £Q._r g

a sufficient argument against population growth

-8-

are open to criticism.
2.

Tha !)enafit cost studies of population control.

P8r s 3, of cours8, the

use of ben3fit cost terminology is siraply a way of describing the reeulttJ,
~-':. .~;·· ... . ......·". and do3s not imply anything about the objective function used (i. e •• how
the benefits and costs were measursid).

In fact howavar, much of this literature can be

catagoriz9d together since it has tended to usG a specific implicit 1,,anner of defining
benefits which is inconsistent with thG above discussion.

One tend~mcy has baen to

rafar to relative effactiveness of investment in output increasing and in population
reducing dirzctions. whern equal effectiveness is dafined by the achievement of a
given incor118 par capita figure.

6

The use of such a criterion obviously biases the

results in favor of population control if the utility of the rnpDsentative person at the
average per capita income of the country in question is positive.

It presumes that

total welfare is the same for two populations with the same par capita income, regard•
less of tha total population.
Other benefit cost analyses compare the present value of a person's expected
future contribution total output (his marginal production) with the present value of
his expected future consumption.

The underlyinp.: welfare function is ambi~uous, but

the focus seems frequently to be on the impact of the additional person on the welfare
of the rest (per se an implausible criterion as just discussed) or on the impact of that
person on the system's savings potential-also per se unsatisfactory.
3.
6

Over life utility analysis of a country's existing population.

7

This

..
An example of this approach is Stephen F.nke, "The Fconomic Aspects of

slowing Population Growth"
7

Economic Journal, Vol. LXXVI, Harch 1%6.

Examples of this type of analysis include E. Phelps, op. cit.

-sanalysis has clear advan:ages ov3r bofo the preceding categories, the goal is an overall
appraisal of ti1e situation; it permits, for example, taking into account the fact that
while childran may lower per capita consumption and income in the short run they may
have over-lifotirne 0enefits for their parents associated with the increases in the rate of
return to capital which the higl1er

L/K

ratio implies; but the analysis does not deal

with comparisons of welfare across differnn~ population sizes; it manages to hold
population size constant by appraisin0 exclusively the welfarn of the existing population
and focussing on what population growth ratG is, for them, the optimal.

It could be

argued--and it would be a valid parallel with the nature of "national economics "--that
this is the nlevant question.

But it is clear that many of the people involved in the

8 The
discussion of population feel that the issue should not be so circumscribed.
many discussions of the appropriate level of the social rate of discount--and a basic
C·
_,

component of this discussion is philosophical--cannot b8 avoided.

8 This is not to deny that und-er certain spacial conditions it may be the case
that maximization of one g2r:::rat5.on or one group I s income is consistent with maxi
mization of anofoer group's, and that it thcr2fore bacomas irrelevant what their relative
.narginal utility ·of income is; bu: these are strikingly unlikely COi1ditions.
9 It is both a strength and a w2akn3ss of some examples of this form of
analysis that children are treated as objects producing utility for the parants.
Failure to allow for this p::-estun"'l.bly positive contrlbuHon to parental welfare is a
weakness in mucl1 of the other andysis (which irnplicity assumes it to be zero) but
the implicit assumption that the tr':iJ.ity l2v2l of the childr2n is per sa to be disregarded
obviously represents an h::.~c-:-:.p!et::::ncss in the analysis. But, as in other types of
analysis, each of the approuches makes contributions to the overall question,
and the only danger is in assuming that any one can contribute the full answer.
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4.

P..

complete

analysis

T'lust

take. into account the total cardinal

utility or social welfare ove,r t-ime -eorn:spo:o.di ng to different combination s of population

size and income per capita at different points of time; the analysis must make some
presumption about whether and where, in tsrms of consumption levels, the zero
utility level is reach,3d, and about the over time social rate of discount--w h.ich is

necessarily equal to the interest rate.
The b~m3fit cost analysis has focussed very much on comparison s of specific

forms of investment•
population programs versus. ........other
And, as ~,·ie·tv~fl, one implicit value judgm3nt in most benefit cost

---

analysis of population programs is that social welfare is a function exclusively of
income per capita and not of population size, a dubious presumption , and one almost
inconsisten t with th2 general presumption of economics that "p3ople matter"; but this

strange assumption by no means precludes on.:;'s drawing ~eful,,;resu lts

from this fon.1

of analysis, if only because it is usually fairly simple to make the adjustment whioh
the reader feels necessary to such analysis to convert it to his own different framework.
A second adjustment typically necessary is for the failure to assume any direct utility
derived by parents from children.

Finally, of course, such calculation s do not go

beyond tha analysis in terms of income per capita to consider, for example, the long
for

run positive effects ··,1 the currant generation of high population growth leading to a
high rate of return to capital. The implicit presumption , one might say, is that if
income per capita can be moved to a higher level at a given point in time, that will
be highar for all age cohorts. lO
raise the probability that it will ,~t,g,~~_t;l
.
... :--~.•-·:.-·..... ·y

.Tr\ In Enke,

op. cit. parental utility from childrnn was implicitly taken into
account when he indicat.3d that the effectivene ss comparison h-~ was making between
investment :1:~,~ a population progra,n and '.-. inv,estment in dams, steal plants, etc.,
pertained only to th3 policy of aiding and permitting parents to limit families to the

-11-·

'.i'lhen actual benafit calculations are made, necessary to compare with cost
figures or to generate internal rat0s of return, )the frequent assumption is that the
benefits an~ composed of the present valu~ of consumption "rebas2d II by not having
the child.10 ·l;;harn the analysis goes beyond the childhood period, the marginal
worlcinR

productivity of the person in the labor forc8 for the rest of his/life may be discounted
and subtracted from the consumption costs. ,, hen the analysis is in the context of
a labor surplus economy, the difference between consumption and marginal productivity
may be negative through the individual's whole life, so negative value must therefore
be calculated.

In the opposite case a positive value would usually emerge: in non11:'. 7

labor surplus economies the discount rate becomes a key factor.·

Harvey Leibenstein,

benefit/

in criticizing so.ne aspects of th-e/cost analysis, refers to the ambiguity and the
unsatisfactory nature of th3 w8lfar2 analysis involved in assuming that avoiding
18.3
consumption is a ben2fit to an economy.
He argues that we cannot handle such
size they really pr3for. In other words the marginal children to whom the calculation
refers implicitly produced negative utility for the parents. In relation to this goal of
maximizing income of the present generation, his ratios under3stimate the averaga
productivity of tha population program. But the analysis was still not complete in the
sense mentioned 3arliar.
,1;:#

1n ]': S8e Enke, op. cit.;. • • Note that it might not be appropriat3 to both traat this
as a benefit and to treat "disutility of parents avoided" as a benefit, since presumably
the consumption the child would und8rtake is one of the d~terminants of that parental
disutility which tha birth would avoid.
10 • 2 Note that the implicit welfare assumption in the analysis which compares

benefits (as defined by the consumption foregone of the individual) and costs is that
direct utility of the pzrson whose birth is prevented is either zero or irrelevant to the
consideration.
1n.3

Harvey Leibenstein, "Pitfalls in the Benefit Costs Z\nalys1s of Birth
Preventl9n" Population Studies •••
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••

ideas without initially having some social v..~.fare criteri orl''i~i.81-in cludee -~ff±l<tr~n·
., as

such, as wall as tha consumption goods, as variables in the objective function.

10.4

He disapproves of the frequent failura to distin,Juish in benefit cost analysis between
the 6th or 7th child, frequently unwanted by the family, and the first or second. To

the .extent that the issue is what tha family's utility is from the child, it is satisfactori ly
taken care of in the Phelps typa analysis of the present value of the over life income
or welfare stream of the existing generation. To the extent that, regardless of parental
utility, a sooiety should presumably be interested in the income of a child wbo might be

born, it is not taken into account by the Phelp' s analysis. Leibenstein notes also
"the mere fact that a birth is not wanted does not make it socially undesirable without
some initial criterion which leads to this conclusion ."
Leib2instein also disputes the implicit assumption that the prevented birth is of
10.5

a person who, if born, would baa marginal worker· , especially since the effects of a
1~·4 In later dynamj.c models Bnke defines the benefit in any year as "the
difference in GNP per head with and without birth control multiplied by tha population

with contracepti on. " (Presumably th2i studies referred to include s. Enke and R. G. Zind,
"The effect of Fewer Births on Average Income", Journal of Biosooial §cience. No. 1,
1, January rnGs, p. 41 and "Birth Control for Economic Developmen t", Science, May 16,
1969.) He notas that with these dynamic .moclels, where for exampl:a the effect on
savings is taken into account, benefit cost ratios of 80 or so are not uncommon over
30 years.
In his reply, Leibenstein notes specifically that the existing population must
be considered, as well as intra and intergenera tional prefernnces . It is difficult to sea
why there should be any special slgnificanca in maximizing GNP per head of the existing
population unless we view all future additions to that population as slaves. Adding
the money value of the psychic value of children does not patch up the situation. "It
seems to me that the entire analysis has to be carried out in terms of psychic values or
utilities and not in terms of the monetary value of the "psychic value" of children."
Laibenstein presents a diagram (page 118) vsry similar to mine although his
context is tha discussion of when the BC ratio will and will not favor a smaller pop
ulation size.
11

11

10 5
• Ibid, p.165.
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Labor Share and Income Equality in Large Population Compared with Small Population
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-13planning program might fall much more readily on miiddle class workers than marginal
ones! 0 • 6 Leibenstein argues further, that the cost of acceptance and achieving a
prevented birth are very much understated in the analyses carried out thus far;
substitutability among techniques of population control is one factor leading to under
estimates of the cost of acceptance.

In his rejoinder, Enke suggests strongly that

it is the poorest who are in need of assistance if they are to use contraceptives,
h worse o ff •lO. 7
sot h at any i ncome redistribut i on i s f rom t he better o.ff tote

Even in terms of the level of
discussion corresponding to point (1) above, we are surprisingly in the dark.

Few

empirical studies have tried to relate, either in a sophisticated econometric fashion
or otherwise, the rate of growth population and the rate of growth of product or its
distribution.

10 8

• Among the few which have attacked the problem directly is one by

l0, 6 correspondingly, a family planning program financed out of general taxes
could benefit the responsive moddle class families at the expense to some extent of
the 2oor.
lO · 7 S. Enke, "Leibenste:f.n on the Benef-f.ts A11d Costs of Birth Control Proitrams" •

10.P
Simon Kuznets in a 1966 study, questioned the by then more or less
conventional wisdom that population growth deters economic development by pointing
out that an over time analysis of a cross section of 11 now developed conntries did
not suggest this; with respect to. the half century prior to World War I he observed no
relationship between the population growth rate and the rate of growth of income per
capita. (Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of Economic Growth of Nations, Part
I: Levels and Varitability of Rates of Growth", Economic Development and Cultural
4Jlsnge, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October 1956), p. 30. But it is not surprising (for a variety of
reasons) that there be no apparent relationship for the new developed COlllltries.
Kuznet's analysis was partial since it did not distinguish countries according to their
original man/land ratios nor consider other possibly important factors. Since the
period in question witnessed substantial migration from the high population density
countries to the low ones, there are serious identification problems which mean that thes
data tell us little or nothing about the implications of population growth in the in
dividual countries; other things were too far from being equal. Countreis with rapid
growth in income per capita both pulled migrants to them and generated little pressure
to keep family size down.
More recent evidence limited to the underdeveloped countreis, w~re migration
is not an important phenomenon are presumably more relevant. Easterlin (op. cit.)look
ing at 37 countries in the period 1957-58 to 1963-64 found no relation between real per
capita income growth and rate of population growth. But a number of these countries

-14trarle

suffered consid~irable terms of /ef~ects during this pe:-iod so that the rate of growth of
their per capita output and per capita income may have been substantially different; tha
population hypotheses relate to output.
Vbws as to tha effects of populatio:1 gro\·;th over the long sweep of history are
very disparate, not surp::-!singly in view of the limited info:mation with which judgments
can be made. Eagen (£ • .C:. H~gen, "Population and i::conomic Growth, " American Economic
Review, Jumi 1S59, No. 49, p. 310-27.), at the one ex'.:reme, argues foat income induced
population growth has nowhere p:-evented even a mode!"ate increase in ag-1regate income
from leading to an increase in income per capita. T:1e present day relevance of such a
comment seems open to q'.les':io:1.• S?..1.-:e it is douh'.::t~l that prior to foe 20th century
condiiionsh..vouI·cj- have permi~ted the population grc·.vth rate to accelerate very fast even
in cases of fairly rapid gro-vrt.:1 o:: incorn-3 per capita; even in the period 1900-World
Vvar II the model rate of popt~I2.-::ic:1 growth for peasant societies was only O. 5 to 1. 0
percent; with a relatively rigid popdation g-ro•Nth ra:e Hagen's conclusion would b8
more or less a foregone one. But thJ.s is not to say thc:t the ge.ins from a burst of growth
during one period might not be wiped out if popu!aticn growt!1 t!-len accelerated and re
tained that higher (bat stHl not ra.ptc1) rate of grm·,th 0·1er a lc::.ger period of time.
At th-e other end of the spectrn.m Speng~er {Joseph A. Spengler, 11 Demographic
Factors in £arly iviodGrn Eco:-!.orr..5.s Dev2.~o,m:mt, 11 D2.edl,u_s_, Spring 1968, p. 433.) implies
that the speedup in the r~te c: r:cmth of. income per c2.~:.t=:i in·\., astern Europ-e in the early
modern period 1,1ay have been ~h2 rnsuL: of the :::-el~:~f.veJ.:1 !o-.'l b~rth rate which followed
on the developm0n~ of a p:::tte:·a o: lc:1'~3:- r,--.~:-::-:age there (someV.me betw0en tl1e 14th and
17th centuries) th3n that fov:::d i'J. EJ.s':2::-n St=::-c;_;e or 0 1.'.~sfde Ev.ror:ie. It app-sars that
V\iestern European bir-::h rates ·::e:-e r.:::·ely cv2r 38 even b8:ora the spread cf birth control.
Higher birth rates in other rec5.0~1s ~-.:ch as ,'\.sia bs':·:rnen 1650 and 1900, did not imply a
faster population gro·.vth t:12.::1 in Enro:::8, bl'.t rat~12::- h.igl:er bir:h 9 nd d9at~1 rates and
therefore higher depencency r.:·~2s.
PerlB!)s n-.o:i:e ,·.rc;~k b::!s_ l::2::·1 p)::::;::ed on 2.:1aly::/:-:J the impact of e::onomic develop
ment on population gro·:1t'..1 t~::>.:'.1 vi:::-~ vers:1. 'I'..1..e fr:::t th2t bc:~1 relations n·,ay be rather
strong creates a severe ic~e::r~:::~:c:::1tio~1 r:-:·o)~,18m. Or:e re~cmt at-~empt to relate socio
economic development to pcp~_,_}2':::c:1 gro·Nt:1 is t~:::t c:'.: I::ma Ac~e!man. (!rrr.a Adelman,
"An Economet:ii: An":lys:s of Fc:c11J.::•~~.o:1 G:-0·:1:h, " ~,p.5r;; ~-3:.n.J:..:-::2nf1m}.c Rev!s\~', Vol. Llll,
June 1963, p. 31·1.) TbJs c:-oss c-::.,~_~:--:.~;7 r:'c::-..1.:::!y r.eJ::·~2:; 2.:·_;8 spec:.:::.c birth ra."'.:es to income,
level of indust:::.2.E;:::~tic::-: {s c r::::r••.,e-::::::c}. ,•.,~.th ~::13 L~·iel c:'.: -:..~:::-'.Ja:1~..-~:.::.'.on), an index of aducat
ion, and POlJllJ.:.~'.~.,:::1 de:::si.i.::,; ~ ·: :-c~.Jt3s age ::;J:-:::--~:·.c c! ::::.-·:11 :-c"'.:3s to income, rate of
change, industrir1Ezatio:-:, 2,::cl h::::.:t')., T~:e D.'_1 .l.t::9~8 rer:~3ss~;o::1s indicate that age
specif!c birth rates te:ld t0 v2.::·-.; c:~·~2-:::-i:':, -;:::.t:1 1-:-sz- c::::,~"'.::: L!C".:':-:.13 in the lo:-:0 run, neg
atively with the sc::::~.oes-:i:~.c::"'.'.~ ;,1::e11c,i.:3nJ. o.ssc:::.~t'e:1. v,i:~1 foG u:-banizution process and
with education a.r.d negct;.ve1.y 'i.'!itl1 pop:.1J.c.'~.1.c::1 de::::,J.t'/. Death rntes bear a negative
long run relation \\·i.th eco:nor..1is co:::cE:ic'.":.s, also ,.,.,ith 1.1,:-banlz,:.tion and industrialization_
and with health c2.:i:e. Put:J.r..g -::11.ese rsst)~::s to·:;rether Le c:iu~hor concludes that the in
fluence of socioecc:.1.orr.ic ve.::-:::~.1.es on the der:'.1os:;ro.phi.:: fec:.t1_~res of a society is much
smaller than the 3£:-:ec-:: c: rc-:-,1:l?.~tcn g::o·.,:~:h t1.::o::1 eco::iomic develc!Jment; thus one would
not expect popuJa.tion ir.r:::2.:.se to Y:ipe 01.1 -t: go.::.ns f;;-cm inc!"e2sed ir:come per capital. Un
fortunately it mt!s: be bo::::.e ::.:1 r.:'.r..d thc:t the c::c:;s com:!:~y info:-r.13.•~icn O!l v,hich any such
study is based is s•:iU q•.~::·e ::::·•,;:"!.
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Kuznets.

11

E3 found a positive rank correlation between population growth and

economic growth among 21 countries of Asia and Africa (excluding the more developed
countries of Israel and South Africa), among 19 countries of Latin i.\merica, and among
the 40 countries treated as a single group.

Tha correlations ara not statistically

significant, but Bagen considars that the absence of negative correlation is significant.
(Here it must ba ascertained whether Kuznets used total income or per capita terms).
V-hile empirical resaarch may eventually throw new light on the relationships, the
number of other factors affecting output growth and distribution is impressive and it
would be optimistic to assume _that they could all be appropriately allowed for in a
statistical analysis.

J\t present th3 empirical studies on the relationship still suffer

too many such pro:!.:>lems to furnish convincing conclusions on the natura of the pop
ulation growth-economic performance links.

Correspondingly, careful theorizing, and

empirical work which throws light on specific (possible) links in the chains of causation
between demographic and economic variabl3s may ba useful.

In this paper we effect a simple (perhaps superficial) classification of tha ways
in which population growth would be ,3xpected to affect growth of output, distribution of
income, and smployment in three familiar economic models, i.e., the neoclassical
model (defined here to refer to a mod·el with perfect factor and product markets and the
absence of unemployment) 1 ~ the Keynesian model, and the labor surplus

resulting

II

Simon Kuznets, "Population and Economic Growth", Proceedings of the
American Philosoph:1.cal Society. No. 3, CTune 1967), p.170.
12

At various points in the discussion we note how the results are affected
by market imperf3ctions (monopoly, etc.) of the type which do not prnvent market
clearing; "Keynesian" type imperfections which lead to involuntary unemployment are
dealt with saparately.

model. The discussion of the first two is in part designed to lead up to the labor
surplus cas~, since that model or something akin to it appears relevant for many
underdeveloped countries (especially soma of the densely populated ones). In tha
context of aach model static and dynamic implications of population growth 13 are
distinguished. Finally# summary comments are made on the state of empirical knowledge
with respect to the relevant coefficients.
Most of the discussion is# therefore# at the level of No. l above# 1. e., simply
trying to appraise the relationship between population growth and income per capita 13 •5

13 It may be assumed that the once familiar concept of the ..optimum population"
is not now considered very relevant in discussions of the population question in under
developed countries; the rate of population growth appears to have substantially more
ralevance than the absolute population. The optimum population concept is a static
one; objections to and limitations of this and related concepts are well presented in
United Nations, Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends# New York:
United Nations, 1953, pp. 233-38.
Although the 11 optimum population II theory in its simplest version is not very
relevant--it essentially assumed that capital and technology were fixed--the basic idaa
of the possibility of increasing returns to scale must not be neglected. A handy
synthesis of this concept and the possible relationships between rate of growth of
population and of capital is presented by Ohlin. (Goran Ohlin, Population Control and
Economic ~evelopment, Development Center of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Paris 1967, p. 61.) (He does not, however, analyze in detail the
determinants of this relationship. )
One suggested index of overpopulation, though not necessarily a measure of the
negative effects of overpopulation, is the total dependency ratio, i.e. # number of people
under 20 and over 65 relative to the number of people of 20-64 years. It is suggested by
David R. Kamerschen, ("On An Operational Index of Overpopulation 11 # Economic Develop
ment and Cultural Change# January 1965, p.169) that a country is overpopulated if this
ratio is greater than 100. Kamerschen's position seems to represent an invalid line of
thought: that because the variable suggested may be correlated with overpopulation as
appropriately defined in some more basic sense, it is a good one to use. This latter
contention could# of course, have interest# but ,,needs to be demonstrated before such a
rule of thumb approach should be taken.
it
13.5 One of the aarlier quantifiers of the implications of population growth was
Stephen Enke# e.g. 1 "The Economic Aspects of Slowing Population Growth," £conomic
Journal# March 1966.

and its distribution.

It could be quickly broadened to include the implications of

total population

,\

The relevance of the direct utility deriving
from childrnn is taken into account and discussed.
A.

(1) Demographic and Economic Variables in the Neoclassical lil.iOdel: Static Analysis

Since in the neoclassical model with fr3ely working markets there is no
unemployment problem, the economic varia.blas of primary interest are per oapita income
and distribution of income. If constant or decreasing returns to scale prevail, then
decreasing i"i1arginal productivity of each factor characterizes the equilibrium state for a
firm, an industry, or the economy as a whole; under such conditions a higher pop
ulation would, at a given point in tii:n.e, imply a lower average income par capita since
it would imply a lower "other factors/labor" ratio.

14

Incraasing marginal productivity

of labor for the economy can only occur when there are increasing returns to scale
(except under the rather implausible circumstance where tha marginal productivity of
some othar factor is negative); they are consistent with a purely competitive system
12.:, The frequently mentioned rnlationship between adequate consumption levels
of labor is formally rather similar to the existence of decreasing
productivity
the
and
returns to scale; i.e. an increase in the labor force provokes, along with whatever
decrease in the marginal productivity of labor would occur if the labor quality were
exogenously fixed, a furthar decrease associated with the decreased consumption which
results from the direct decrease in marginal productivity and presumably in wages. It
would be possible, as a first approximation, to take this factor into account in the
. definition of the production function; since the stock of capital and labor determine the
total output the corrasponding consumption levels may be implicit--assuming a
specified pattern of distribution; tha quality of labor is thus implicit also. Tha
possibility of such a simple definition of the situation are limited by the need for the
specific income distribution assumptions.
For discussions of this consumption-productio n relationship see Harvey
Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, New York, 1957; Paul
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·:ti=:-·
<·
only if the 3COnomies of scale are external to tha firms; otherwise th3y would imply
widespread inonopoly. 'tfThe above discussion abstracts from the question of whether
"income per capita II is an appropriate measure of walfare.

In fact an important

weakness is its failure to reflect the present value of future and past streams; assuming,
as seems fairly plausible, that a society's obj_ective function involves maximization
of the discounted future welfare streams of individuals , it is possible for income per
capita to be high2r at each point of time in one system but for each individual 1 s over
Wonnacott, 11 Disguised and Overt Unemployment in Und,3rdeveloped Bconomies,"
Cuarterly Journal of £conom~.cs, Iv!:ay 1962; Edgar O. Edwards, "V✓ ork Effort, Investible
Surplus and the Inferiority of Competition, " Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXXVIII,
No. 2, Octobar 1S71.
Another possibly important consideration brushed over in such a simple
analysis is the fact that a high bi1..~h rate has the effect of reducing feminine partici
pation in the labor force; the exten: of this effect depends on the economic structure,
and whether continuity of job is par~icularly important eithar for masons of productivity
or for more artificial ones.
Still another qualificcJ.tio:1 rnlates to the fact that thz rate of population growth
may affect tl1e distribution o: investm3nt as well as the total. Where certain social
exps:?nditures tend to be given first priority a government may have ;ilore investment
flexibility when fertility is net so high, particularly important if the rate of return is
higher on other forms of investment than ones such as education. On the other hand, of
course, educational expendi:u:es may be more d~.stribution equalizing than many others.
But if lower fertEity permits a higher proportion of children to go to school, likely both
because on thz private side individuals can afford to send more children to school, and
on the public side bacause th3 investment does not have to be stretched so far, the
advantage lies in any case with the low pop1..llat::.on grc·.vth situation.
15

The ques:ion of retu':'ns to scale in a.n economic system as a whole has
been long discussed but little qvantified. It doec appec:.r that economies are likely at
the industry level \':Lern-✓ er '":: ~,:::i".I 12.bo::- and divis~.0:.1 of labor arz important, or
indivisibility marks the produ8t~.on p~ocess. Sor"'.e of these economies may be reopened
via specialization in certGin industries gg.m in"te~national trade, and more could be if
there were not substan~ial barriers to trade. But, on balance, it s3ems conceivable
that a small country may still b0 in the stage of increasing returns to scale. It is much
less likely that th3 conditions of increas~ng marginal productivity of labor of economy
will be fulfilled.

-19-

Ufe income (welfara) to be higher in an other.

Phelps, using the broader and prasumably

more appropriate concept of income, comes to the conclusion that thare is no general
theorical

prssumption;::; that population growth should lower welfare. (edmund S.

Phelps, "Population Increase", The Canadian Journal of Economics, August 1968, p. 497.)
Ha notes that if two golden age growth patterns are compared, one involving more
rapid population growth than the other, the rate of interest (rate of return to capital) will
be higher in the case of more rapid growth, implying that the typical individual would
receive less wages than in the alternative case, but during his dissaving years would
earn a high.ar rate of interest on his accumulated capital.

He concludes that, if it be

assumed that tha direct positive effect of the last child in a given family (i.e., the
marginal direct enjoyment effect) is equal to the marginal cost of that child, then the
overall effect of mora rapid population growth is positive, zero, or negative according
to whether the rate of interest is smaller than, equal to, or largar than the population
growth rate, assuming throughout that the comparison is between golden age states.
In other words, this factor price effect of faster population growth, taken alone, reduces
lifetime parental utility if and only if tha capital intensity of tha economy is smaller
than the goldan rule capital intensity.
Though it is highly unlikely that the set of conditions which would imply a
neutral or positive welfare effect of population growth be fulfilled in L. D. C. •s, it is
certainly necessary, in order to come to valid conclusions on the issue, to take
account of the direct utility effect of childran (often neglected) and of the advantage
(other things being equal) attaching to the higher rate of return to capital caused by
the population growth. The fact that current per capita productivity is lowered by a

larg,~r population does not imply that an individual I s lifetime consumption need decline,
since if h3 tak3s advantaJe of the higher interest rate by redir3cting more of his
16
consumption to the future, the forrnar (negative) effact could conceivably be overcome.
This useful catagorization of the 3ffects of population growth into direct and indirect
(via the impact on factor prices) provides the framework for the next paragraphs.

The Welfare Effect of (Population-Growth Stimulated) Changes in Factor Prices
If the representative family in underdeveloped countries has more children

than would equate marginal direct social benefit with marginal direct social cost, this
implies that th.a indirect effect on welfare via the factor price ratio would have to be
discretely positive to provide an ovarall argument in favor of rapid population growth.
But underdeveloped countries are far from a golden age state with a golden rule capital
intensity and population growth equal to the interest rate; the indirect effect would be
clearly negativa in a country with a population growth at 3 percant and a rate of return

to capital sornawhere between 10 and 30 percent. As always, oth.3r extarnal
diseconomies associated with the aYJ.stence of factors in fixed supply (living space,
etc.) and the positive implications of any increasing returns to scale of economy must
be allowed for as well,but it seems highly unlikely that they would be sufficient to

offset both a negative "direct" effect (as defined above) and a negativa indirect effect.
In any case the issue is not closed by this highly abstract analysis; the
assumptions of perfact foresight savings exclusively designed for subsequant running
down, etc. an not convincing as a "full story".

In the "dynamic" discussion below

16 Phelps notes also the nzed to considar "true extarnaliti3s" associated with
shortage of living space, etc., i.e. with the fixed supply of some factors.
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of some aspects of th;:) population question, more general savings functions are
considered, and their ir.,plications for the question at hand drawn out.
Some Direct Effects of Population Growth on Vv elfare
In many underdeveloped countries it seems clear that actual family size is
above ~~{..family size
.

~

in other words that the "direct" effect of the marginal

child is negative. 17 This is suggested, among other things, by the extensive use of
contraceptive devices when they become availabl8, the high levels of induced
abortions, and the "masked infanticide" (deliberately allowing an unwanted child to die
when he becomes sick)
children than dasired.

18

19

, and the outright statements of women that they have more
Provoked abortion rises with urbanization, presumably because

tha disadvantages of a larger family size an more obvious, the children being at home
more, creating housing congesHon, and being a bigger economic burden. ZO These

17 See, for example, Ronald Freedman, "Norms for Family Size in Under
developad Areas," Proceedin.9 cf the Royal Society. B, Vol.159, 1SG3, p. 222.
18

Doctors also po1.r.t to a related but more unconscious effect, attributed to
the (usually subconscious) v:ish on the part of mothers that their younger children will
die, an effect which shows up in much higher infant mortality rates for later children
than for earli3r ones. See Dr. Benjar:1in Viel, "The Social Consequence of Population
Growth", Populatio~:i Refereng~g~d';'fil!.!!, No. 30, Octobar 1969.

1a

,

" This rasponse was freqt!ent in the CELADE surveys in several Latin
American capitals, e.g. Rafael Prieto Duran and Roberto Cuca Tolosa, Analiais da la
.Encufilta de Fecundidad Jnf...o.r:~a..'PreJiminar
, Cuadros Est·adisticos,Ce ntro de
£studios Sobrn el Desar;ollo
£":!0~-:.0:::ico (Universidad de Los An<les ), Bogota, Sept.
1965. It is intensting to note that even in the United States at present it has been
estimated that 13 to 18 pe::cen: of aH b:i'::ths are unwanted. See J. J. Spengler, "Economic
Growth in a Stationary Populatio::i," Population Reference Bureau Selection No. 38,
Population Reference Bureau Inc., ·v11 ashington, D. C., July 1971.
20

See ibi::"L. Ce.1.-':de's studies in seven cities of Latin America indicated
abortion rates and the pe:-.:-crL::ge of women using contraceptives; in Colombia the rate

various manifestations of family size grsater than desired occur primarily in the lowsr
income groups. The hospital cases resulting from illegal abortions are primarily in the
lower social economic classes.

21

Masked infanticide follows the same pattern. In

general it ls true that upper income groups match desires to reality batter than the
lower income groups.
Th3re are other reasons to question the assumption that direct social benefit:;
and direct social costs of a family's last child are typically equal. Vv hen society
provides certain social services like education, free or at subsidized rates, the family
calculus does not take into account these social costs.

(See, for e:n.ample, Harold J.

Barnett, "Population Problems--Myths and Realities", Economic Develogment

and

Cyltural Change. Vol.19, No. 4, July 1971).
Along different lines, it may be pointed out that one of the benefits of children
is the

0

security 3ffect" they provide•-assurtng one's old age. This is an unquestioned

benefit but tha fact that it can be relatively easily and successfully substituted for by
old age welfare schemes implies that under slightly different ••rules of the game"
families would choose smaller family sizes. And the .,benefits .. in question are not
of

really eontributfons ._;_the children, but rather unfortunate problems which their presence
of induced abortion was 16 per 100 pregnancies in Bogota, 20 or more in other cities.
and about 8 in rural communities. It may be presumed that any bias in these figures
would be downward. The existence of abortion (which prevents the birth of unwanted
children) 1s of course not a proof that unwanted children are born. But given the
surrounding evidence, the best guess is that the abortions are matched but many more
unwanted births not so prevented.
21

Abortion is resorted to primarily by married women, much less so by single
women. It is more frequent among women with primary or no education than those at the
secondary bvel.
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may prevent.

Tha something which substitutes for quantity of childran may be

quality of childran; statistical evidence of this phenomenon has baen adduced by

·;..,._Tray. 22

~

The fact that the marginal direct private effects of children are frequently
negative obviously calls for policies to facilitate control of family size and

tbAf. fact

that desired family size is sensitive to the supply conditions of substitutes implies

that these conditions should normally be manipulated, and that in the general policy
approach to population, desired size should not be treated as an eJ::ogenous variable.
Some theoretical considerations suggest that rapid population growth worsens the
distribution of income but the issue is not clearcut (see below). The proposition is
unfortunately particularly difficult to test empirically, both because of the usual
(serious) idontification problems involved and also becausa the impact would not be
expected to be quick, but rather to build up over a substantial period of time.

On the

first count, it is clear, for example, that low population growth accompanies higher
income levels and that improvements in distribution do too

23

, but that these improvements

22 Dennis ueTray, paper present.ad at The Economic Growth Center, Yale
University, February 1972.
23 controversy still surrounds this issue, with a number of observers doubting

that, when all appropriate factors are taken into account, there has bean significant
improvement in income distribution in the developed countries. That the personal
distribution of income generated in the current production process has improved is
little questioned, but it has been argued that the more relevant family distribution has
improved less and that when income from asset appreciation is taken into account the
improvement -!l:f~ still less. An example of this sort of critique of the generally accepted
figures is Richard iv.i. Titmuss, Income Distribution and Social Change, London, George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962.

-24-

may be explained by factors unrelated to demographic devalopments.

On the second,

rapid population growth at one point of tima would not be expectsd to affect income
distribution until say 20 or so years later.

Since differences in the rate of population

growth were hss in the developing world of 20 or 30 years ago than they are now,
the small range of that independent variable would make statistical analysis very
difficult. 2L1
'4..S

suggested above, the rnlationship between population growth and incoma

distribution cannot be simply analyzad from a theoratical viewpoint, among other reasons
because it involvas specification of tha distribution of the capital stock among two
populations of different size. Referring to the smaller population (which results from
slower growth) as Sand tha larger one as 1, and assuming (a) both labor and capital are
homogeneous (b) constant returns to scale and (i::) the same total capital stock in both
cases, Table I summarizes some of the interesting possibilities. Tha effect of a larger
labor force is to decrease average product of labor and incraase that of capital. w·tth
elasticity of substitution equal to one it implies a better distribution of income whenever
that of capital is better; 2~ith elasticity greater than one, a population increase
improves income distribution if ca!)i:a.l distribution is unchanged
more concentrated; with elast:.ci~y

c: substHution less

or even somewhat

th,rn one, the larger population

implies a worsened distributio!'l., t•.nless capital dis'::r~b·..1t!on is better by some threshold
24 It might be of interest to analyse the income distribution of different age
cohorts as a function of the rate of popul.a.t!on grm•:th at the tim3 each was entering
the labor force, but the resu!ts would be difficult to interpret.

25

for any X.

The top X% of the population has the same percent of income as before,
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amount.

In short, thz zlasticity of factor substitution s in th~ aggragat::i production

function is a key variable, so the empirical ;;videnc~ on it is important; a second key
variabl8 is the relationship betwz~n rate of population growth and th.J distribution of
capital.

83for3 turning to these questions, however, it is worthwhile referring to

the extensive bem~fit cost literaturz rzfarring to population programs with a view to seeing
what relation it bears to the above discussion.
Empirical Evidence on the Elasticity of Factor Substitution
Once again, while there have been innumerable studies estimating cross
country, one country, one industry, etc., production functions with correspondin g
deductions about the elasticity of substitution , most of these are, for one reason or
another, not directly applicable to the issue at hand, though taken together they at
least provide some guidelines.

Empirical estimates of substitution elasticities are

cross section, time series, or some combination .

In all cases it is exceedingly

difficult to know what marginal rate of substitution , if any, is really being measured.
In cross section studies, problems are least when a homogeneous product is considered,
but it is necessary to assume that {a) each firm faces the same production function and
(b) the observed differences in factor proportions are due to factor market imperfection s
(i.e. different factor prices facing the different firms).

It in fact the production

functions were different from each firm, the true average elasticity of factor sub
stitution (this variable would presumably vary across firms) might bear no relation to
the observed one--it: could be much higher or much lower.

While careful statistical

analysis can give hints as to what is really being measured, so that the seriousness
of this problem should perhaps not be exaggarated, neither should it oe disregarded.
,;/ithin a given economy, the seriousness of this "identification" problem is
aggravated when the estimation refers to many products.

Relatively few analyses

implicitly assuma the same production function for entirely different industries, but most
involve some degree of product homogeneity.
In cross country studies it is more plausible to assume that the different
factor proportions of the different observations are "generated" by different factor
price ratios, but the validity of the assumption of the same production function is much
more dubious.

(For a discussion of this point see Richard R. Nelson, "A Diffusion

Modal of International Productivity Differences in Manufacturing Industry, " American
Economic Revi 9w. Vol. LVIII, No. 5, Part I, December 1968.)
Over time studies face the difficult task of sorting out non-neutral technical
changa and the response of factor proportions to factor pricas.

IV:any studies have

failed to introducs independant evidence on changing factor prices, further reducing the
level of oonfidanca which can be placed in them.
In short, no obvious methodology can provide a reasonabb level of confidence
in the absence of good independent evidance on th0 nature of production functions,
interfirm diffarencas, factor markets, technological change, etc.

Rate of Population Growth and the Distribution of Capital
It is usually assumed that a fast population growth implies greater lnequaltty
in the distribution of capital, since the overall rate of population growth basically
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reflects that of tlB lowar income groups.

This view could ba oversimplified, however,

and a careful analysis of the relation is called for.

To prndict the -~ffact of population

growth on family or personal income distribution, (the real issu8 of interest) it is necessary
to know not only how functional distribution is affected but also (a) whether and how
the vegetative rats of population increase is related to income level, (b) to the extent
that some of the population increase com.~s from families with capital, in what pro•
"3
portions this capital is divided up among the expanding family, . ;; and (c) whether people

who earn income from capital also participate in the labor force and if so how their labor

service diffars {if it does) from that of the proletariat.
of assumptions

·.s;s

Probably !!s-_::,irl-,:wf.lil>l.e a $:ornb.ination

,a:J:ir in the prediction of the income distribution ir.ipact of fast

population growth would be an elasticity of substitution in the neighborhood of O. 5 ,_
1. 0

34

3
and a lass equal distribution of wealth the larger the population. 5 Given

JJ JAs a plausible description of an historical process, there seems little use
in assuming that wealth will be distributad to anyone but tha hairs of the wealthy.
3 i.:: h.rnong the studies of intarest in this connection the following may be

oited. • ....

35

The purpose of this simple comparative static analysis is to compare two
(or more) populations which could exist at some future time, according to demographic
events in the interim period. ·:,· e abstract from the fact that other conditions than the
size of the P01Julation might be expected to differ at that future data, and attempt to
isolate the effect of population size differences ceteris paribus. A more complete
analysis would take into account, for example, the fact that lower income groups
usually have more children and even larger complet3d families; this would suggest
that the larger populations would correspond to less equal wealth distributions.

-28-

constant returns to scale, this would imply (as indicated in Tabb 1) that the fast~r
population growth would faad to a more concentrated distribution oi income.

Since

distribution depends only on tha marginal rates of factor substitution (and not on their
average productivity levels), cases whers the marginal productivity of labor is rising
in the relevant range do not differ in this rsspect from tha constant returns to scale
case as long as th3 production function is homogeneous of any degrn:J; in these cases
(homogeneous of degr::ie greater than one) the affect of a givan percent difference in the
labor force on relative factor incomes is the same as with constant returns to scale; total
output does, of course differ according to foe degree of tha function.

Only if the ratio

lvlPL/MPk (marginal productivity of labor to marginal productivity of capital) rises as
the labor force increases can the labor share be an incrnasing function of population.

36

The. strongest disequalizing effact of larger population on capital distribution

would occur when a laboring class with no capital generates all of the population
increase; giv3n the expectad result that wages fall, the redistribution is likely to be
quite negativ0.

ft the other (unlikely) extreme, if th;3 group which derives most of its

36 If them are constant returns to scale and MP is higher the greatar the
labor force in th0 relevant range, then avGrage· income-: pet'capita will :b.e. a'.dacroasing
·

function of population but distribution will be better the larger the population (since
income per unit of capital is a sharply decreasing function of population.) It is
impossible for the production function to have constant returns in all factor combinations.
since it is non homogeneous. But there could b3 constant returns for a particular
factor proportion. If thare are incraasing returns to scale and MP 1 /iVlPk is a positive
function of Lin the relevant range, then the population increase can both increase
income par capita and improve its distribution. This combination of circumstances
sounds rather unlikely. A final possibility is that MP 1 /MPk is an increasing function
of L, but not a sufficiently positive function to imply a rising iviP , given the returns to
scale characteristic of the production function. Then a larger po~lation could imply a
lower average wage (and a fortiori, a lower average income) but a bettar distribution.
This somewhat quixotic case can probably also be dropped as of littl3 interest.

I
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income from capital generated all of the population increase, and also divided the
capital evenly among the new larger capitalist group then as long as the capital share
7
does not rise the distribution would be made more even at the top::s , and left unchanged
at the bottom. 38

Note

that if capitalists did not earn labor income, population growth would not lead to any
increase in the labor force, nor change the wage rate nor total income.

It would lead

to a lower average income and a better distribution.

More likely than non-participation of capitalists in the labor force is the
non-homogeneity of their labor service with that of the laboring class.

It is useful to

think of the differnnt types of labor in the real world E,vith differences being due to
education level, basic skill, experience, etc.) as differnnt factors; this framework
permits a variety of assumptions as totheir substitutionability or complementarity with
each other.

39

31

Specifically, for some X (perhaps small) the share of total income accruing
to the top X percent would fall.
38

Specifically, the share of total income accruing to any Y% who had no
capital would be unchanged--as long as the labor share was unchanged.

39

The alternative is to lump human capital together with physical capital, and
assume perforce that capital and labor are complimentary factors. In this context, a
capitalist who works contributes one unit to the total supply of labor; in this framework
one would conclude that an increase in the number of capitalists, all having some job,
with the total amount of physical plus human capital held constant, would lower, the
wage rate.
Clearly the "different factors" approach is the better one, since it allows more
flexibility of assumptions about substitutability and complementarity. The issue is
whether information requirements and needs for more complicated production function
specification permit th8 approach.

The existence of three factors increase<s the range of possible results if the
elasticities of substitution are different from one.

40

For example, wages could be an

increasing function of the capitalist population and of the corresponding supply of
"skilled" labor, if unskilled labor had a complementarity relation with both physical
and human capital, such that when the ratio· between human and physical capital rises
the marginal productivity of unskilled labor also rises.
·while no general prediction as to the net effect of population growth on
income 9istribution can be made, a negative effect seams more likely than a positive
one.

In underdeveloped countries all income groups are normally more than self

sustaining population-wise, but, as observed above.growth is likely to be faster in the
lower income groups.

Usually there is some division of capital among the children of

a wealthy person, but not necessarily a very equal one.
Thus, unless unskilled labor is a substitute for the two forms of capital•-and
there seems little evidence to support this possibility--population growth may be
expected to worsen distribution.

This worsening will be faster (a) the greater the

difference in rate of population growth by income level, (b) tha less equally the
capitalists divide their wealth among offspring, and (c) the more complementary is
unskilled labor with each of physical capital and skilled labor. Vvorsening can only be
avoided if either (a) unskilled labor is a perfect or almost perfect substitute for the other
factors, and capital distribution is not a significantly negative function of population

.

size or (b) unskilled labor is not a very close substitute for the other factors but capital

4o High cross elasticities are more frequent the more factors are separately
specified.
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w
distrlb ution is more equal the· larger th~ popula tion. If a large popula tion someho

which
genera ted a prefere nce for that form of capital (as betwee n physic al and human)

also
ls more comple mentar y with unskill ed labor than the other) an improv ement oould
result.
A (ii) N~ocla ssical Model: Dynamic tmalys is
The above compar ative statics analys is involve s the econom ic implic ations of
only be
differe nt levels of popula tion, all other things being equal; its results could
directl y relevan t in the case of a once and for all increas e in popula tion, given
consta nt amoun ts of other factors .

But the compa rative statics questio n "how would

amount
income and its distrib ution differ if the country had a larger popula tion, but the
of capital and the techno logical possib ilities were the same?

1141 is a hypoth etical one

y
with no dynam ic or over-ti me elemen t; almost by definit ion it cannot be directl
rate of
relevan t in any econom ic system . VJ.hen a policy is effecte d which makes the
causes
popula tion growth lower than it would otherw ise have been, it only gradua lly
in the
the actual popula tion to diverge from what it would otherw ise have been, and
proces s it alters other demogr aphic variab les such as the age structu re and the
depend ency ratio. Thus measur ement of the policy• s effects involve s compar ing
.42,43
.
at one
income s over time (theoret ically over all future time ) rather than simply
41 In asking this questio n above it was implici tly assume d that the labor forc:e
genera lly
differe d betwee n any two cases by the same percen t as popula tion. and more
s like
that the two popula tions were identic al in the distrib ution of all charac teristic
age. sex, trainin g, etc; they differe d only in size.
42

£valua tion of the benefit s of any policy which has effects over more than
consta nt
one point of time technic ally require s this treatme nt. But where the effect is
over time, it may not be necess ary to introdu ce time into the analys is.
43

risons
An interes ting and differe nt form of dynami c analys is involve s compa
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specific future date.
A second sense in which comparative statics analysis is unsatisfactory 1s its
failure to allow for the fact that demographic variables may be determinants of the
growth paths of other inputs.

It is plausible to hypothesize that population growth

affects savings rates and thus the capital stock; the rate of technological change
depends on the amount of research and development expenditures, and is in this way
likely to be_ related to savings--it is one form of investment.

~....n11a.ttY~;:_~-- ~,..th

the rate and the nature of technological change could be related

to the rate of population growth,though it is not obvious exactly how.
In drawing out some of these dynamic questions, we will consider the possibly
special characteristics of what may be called the "transition period" i.e. the period
after a change in the rate of population growth and before the various demographic
variables (like age structure) have moved to the new long run equilibrium states
corresponding to the new growth rate (See the discussion, p.

) • Before doing so,

however, it is useful to begin with a comparison {not far removed from the comparative
statics one) of the over time income patterns in two systems where different (constant)
population growth rates prevail and which have the same rates of technological change
and of savings (implying that both are independent of the population growth rate over
the relevant range).

Suppose that previous growth paths have brought both economies to

be~..veen alternative rates of population growth--each maintained over a long period--in
terms of their impacts on grovv1:h of income per capita and its distribution. The question
is different from that involving the effect on the path of the income variables of a
change--either at a given poi!1t of time or occurring gradually over a period of time--from
one rate of population growth to another. It tends to be simpler than the analysis of
interest here, so will be used as a first step in the discussion below.

the same factor proportions, and that one has a population and labor force growing
at X% (say 3%) per year and the other at Y% (say 0%).

(Past capital/labor ratios must

have been different for them to be equal at present.) Then, under most assumptions
about the production function, income per capita will grow faster in the second economy,
and distribution will be more even; the exceptions parallel those discussed in the
comparative statics context, e.g., where there are strongly increasing returns to
scale, income per capita may grow faster in the first economy, and where the production
function is non-homogeneous with MP /MPk an increasing function of the input of labor
1
• ) V\fith a

distribution may be better in it, etc. (See the discussion above, p.

linear homogeneous production function the difference in growth rate of average income
is less than X-Y and depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two factors.

If the only source of increasing income per capita is an increase in capital/labor ratio
(i.e. there is no technological change) then with infinite elasticity of substitution the
L

difference in the two income per capita growth rates would be (X-Y)• L+k

where the

units of labor and capital are each defined as having a marginal productivity of one.

44

44 Thus, a 1% increase in the labor force leads to an increase in income of

( ~}i ) percent,

i.e., a percent increase equal to the ratio of units of labor to units of
representing the elasticity of output with
la or and capital combined, the term
respect to labor and the labor share.
Note that for this particular case the conclusion that income per capita grows
more slowly in the economy with faster population growth is deceptive in one sense: no
one would necessarily be made worse off by the population growth; the wage rate, for
example would not fall; there would simply be less capital per person and either the
capitalist group as a whole would have a lower average (if population growth occurred
there and capital was not divided a·mong the now larger group) or the laboring group would
be numerically greater relative to the capitalists than before, but with the same average
income, or both. If the capital is now divided up more ways, a subgroup which would
be present in either case would be worse off in the fast population growth case.

l+K

-34The greater tha labor share the smaller the effect of the different population growth
rates on per capita income growth.

45

When, at the other extreme, production requires fixed proportions between
labor and capital, then if an economy has initially neither unemployme nt of labor nor of
capital, population and capital must henceforth grow at the same rate to imply full
employment of both factors.

As a result there is no possibility of faster population

growth leading to higher output per capita, unless (a) there was previously unemploy
ment of capital or {b} technologic al change occurs. If, beginning with no unemployme nt,
labor grows faster than the capital stock, then unemployme nt of labor arises and average
income falls continually; if there is originally an excess of capital, then income per
capita remains constan~ until that excess is used up--then unemployme nt of labor
appears and per capita income begins to fall.

In this case, the income per person

correspoind ing to the fixed labor/capita l ratio at which the factors must be used con•
46
stitutes an upper ceiling income in the absence of technologic al change.
45 The limiting case, where labor is responsible for all of the output is a one
factor economy where population growth has no implications unless there are non
constant returns to scale.
46

Introducing such change is not relevant since its impact is simple; our
interest here is exclusively to compare growth rates of per capita income in cases
which differ only with respect to their population growth rates; and within a model which
is kept as simple as possible.
Note that the phenomenon of the upper limit occurs in all cases where the sav
ings rate is high enough to assure faster growth of capital than of labor, except where
the factors are perfect substitutes. The limit is reached abruptly in the fixed proportion
model (i.e. , MPK drops suddenly to zero), and is approached gradually in the case of a
variable proportion's model. The same income per capita is eventually reached regard
less of the population growth rate, so a comparison of final equilibrium is of no interest••
' the only interest lies in comparing growth paths; income per capita in an economy with
slower population growth would begin to rise above that of one with faster growth--the n
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models with different population growth and its

Income per capita is the same in

two

rate of change is the same (zero).

If labor is in excess supply, income per capita falls

faster by X-Y percent in the economy whose population is growing faster.

This limiting

fixed proportions case is not of interest per~, but as being suggestive of the results
for low factor substitutability cases.
Cases between the extremes of perfect substitutability and perfect complemen
tarity produce results, as expected, between those of the two extremes, and one can
think of a continuum of possible negative effects of--assuming a linear homogeneous
production function--population growth rate on the growth of income per capita, the
effect being an inverse function of the relative inportance of labor and {as measured by
the labor share) the elasticity of substitution. The range of this continuum is between
0 and the rate of population growth. Vliith high but not perfect complementarity of
factors, the negative impact approaches the rate of population growth and there is
something close to what, in the case of fixed coefficients, was referred to as excess
supply of labor, i.e •• the marginal productivity of labor is quite low.
The above paragraphs constitute simply the rephrasing of the comparative statics
results in an over-time context, without analysis of the specifically dynamic aspects of
the situation. To be complete, as noted earlier, allowance must be made for the fact
that the savings rate may be a function of the rate of return to capital, the rate of growth
as the capital/labor ratio increased and capital became less and less productive, the
gap would narrow until finally the two trajectories approached each other asymptotically.
In such a model, therefore, the negative effects of population growth would depend on
how long it took the two economies to reach the income ceiling, and on tha rate of
discount. In the real world, of course, technical change has normally been rapid
enough and of a type to keep the marginal product of capital high, so the two time paths
would never really approach each other.

of income, the distribu tion of income, and family size; all of these factors may be
affected by the populati on growth rate as may technolo gical change, especia lly change
which respond s to factor proporti ons and relative factor paymen ts.

If the savings rate

is an increasi ng function either of per capita income or its rate of growth, the above
47
growth.
on
populati
the
of
effects
negative
the
timate
underes
would
analysis
ep"
"first-st
Thus X-Y, the differen ce in two populati on growth rates, is by no msans the maximum
differen ce between the correspo nding growth rates of income per capita, mutatis
.
48
mutandi s; if savings were very respons ive to the rate of growth of per capita income,
this differen ce could be conside rably greater than X-Y.

On the other hand, some

theories suggest a higher savings rate the faster the populati on growth, due to the

latter's tendenc y to cause a more unequal income distribu tion. Thus, even if it were
•
accepte d that for a given econom ic entity (e.g. family) the savings rate was an increas
ing function of the income level and/or the rate of growth of income over the recent

47 Vlhatev er would be the "real" net effect of populati on growth rate on a

country 's average savings rate, it seems unlikely that by itself it could be positive
enough to outweig h the negative effects typicall y resultin g from the less favorabl e
factor proporti ons (lower K/L ratio). As observe d above, if the savings rate were un•
affected by populati on growth, · then income per capita could be expecte d to grow some
where between zero and X percent faster in a system where populati on grows X percent
slower; where the savings rate is positive ly affected by fast populati on growth, this
effect might have to be strong to outweig h the other one. Conside r an economy with
populat ion growing at 3 percent; then, assumin g a fairly optimis tic margina l rate of
return to capital/3 3%, it would require a savings rate higher by 9 percent for income
per capita to grow as fast as it would with zero populati on growth. In other words, a 6
percent savings rate without populati on growth Would generate the same growth of
per capita income as a 15 percent savings rate with 3 percent annual populati on growth.
· The objectiv e here is not to ask whether conside ration of savings could lead
to a reversa l of the earlier results, but rather to see in general which way it works
and how strongly .
48

i. e. holding constan t all variable s determin ed indepen dently of the rate
of populati on growth.

-37-

past (both these factors tending to suggest that the savings ratio would be a negative
function of the rate of population growth), no conclusions could be drawn without
analysis of how population growth affects income distribution and how distribution
affects the aggregate savings rate.

If all savings were carried out by families, the

requisite analysis would tnvolvo (a) the relation between average size of the family and

the savings rate, with the logical hypothesis being an inverse one due to the need for
higher levels of certain consumer axpenditures when family size is larger, and (b) the
impact of population growth on distribution of income by families.
done by incorporated businesses and the government.

But savings are also

It is probably plausible to assume

for each of these groups that the savings rate is a positive function of both income level
and its growth, but there is further the question of how faster population growth affects
the distribution of income among families, government and business, and what their
relative marginal savings proposition are.
The thesis that unequal distribution implies higher savings rates depends on
a marginal propensity to save which rises with income; most of the formulations of the
argument seam to have been couched in the context of family incomes.

49

In fact,

49 In one attempt to calculate a trade-off between improved distribution and
rapid growth, Cline used household budget surveys in four Latin countries, concluding
that the growth rate cost of improving the equality of distribution to the level found in
England would be between zero and 1%, according to the country. {See William R. Cline,
"The Potential Effect of Income Redistribution on Economic Growth in Six Latin American
Countries," The vVoodrow Wilson School, Princeton University Discussion Paper No.13,
August 1970). In one country (Brazil) Cline was able to test for the significance of
whether income was "entrepreneurial" or labor; he concluded that this variable was not
significant, a conclusion contradicting some earlier work (e.g. Hendrik Houthakker,
"On Some Oetenninants of Saving in Developed and Underdeveloped Countries" in E. A.G.
Robinson (editor) Problems in Economic Development, McMillan & Co.. Ltd, London, 1965).
although as Cline notes Houthakker was vague as to whether his conclusions-referred to a

however, it appears that in many developing economies a rather small share of all
saving out of current income is done directly by families, a substantial proportion being
done by the government and by incorporated businesses. SO Both of these entities are
likely to have higher average savings rates than families (although this would depend
on the distribution of disposable income among families).

How the rate of population

growth is likely to affect, via its impact on factor proportions, the distribution of
income among these three sectors is less clear; with an elasticity of substitution
below (above) one, it would be expected that a higher labor/capital ratio would lead to
a greater (smaller) share of income going both to privately owned capital and to
corporate capital; assuming an elasticity below one is more probable, both these shares
difference net of income levels. In any case this is a different issue from the one
mentioned in the text, since it dealt with factors determining the savings rate out of
personal income, not the "business savings" rate. It seems likely that most of the
methodological biases in this study and others like it are towards overestimating the
growth rate cost of income redistribution via the "savings effect", in particular (a) the
implicit assumption that if family savings fall as a result of redistribution, all other
forms of savings will fall in the same proportion and (b) the use of budget survey data
which is very likely to overestimate the marginal propensity to Siive of the permanent
savings function., and very possibly the first derivative of the marginal propensity as
well. The former assumption does receive some support from studies showing sub
stitution among forms of savings, e~ g., as between family and corporate savings.
(See Franco Modigliani, "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving, The Demand for V✓ ealth
and the Supply of Capital: 11 paper presented to the Rome Congress of the Econometric
Society, 1965.) Such substitutability would a priori be expected to be stronger in the
long than in the short run, since it must require some time for some people to evolve
their interpretations of the subsUtutability, e.g. between private savings and social
security contributions. It seems likely that the value of the latter, for example, might
be underestimated at first.
SO Foreign savings may also be important but this phenomenon is ignored here
since the issues raised are much more complex than those surrounding the other forms
of saving. One might note, however, that a reasonable hypothesis would be that the
higher the labor/capital ratio the more attractive would be the country for foreign
investors and the higher the savings which would come from abroad. The effect of these

would be expected to increase.
hard to predict.

But the iI:1pact on the aggregate savings rate would be

51

The factors affecting the share of income going to the government have not
been studied in the detail necessary to permit judgments as to how it might be related
to population developments.

52 One could hypothesize ( in broad accord with observed

reality in many underdeveloped countries) than an uneven distribution of income helps
to create an uneven distribution of social and political power which may in turn imply
relatively few social services, relatively little investment in education, and a relatively
small government sector.

Even when the system has enough inherent democracy to

make the government subject to lower income groups demands for such services, inequality of power tends to make a high average tax rate difficult or impossible politically.
But this conclusion that inequality is likely to be associated with a small government
sector does not imply directly that it will be associated with lower government savings.
savings on national income constitutes a more complicated question than in the case of
domestic savings since at least part of the return to them is taken out of the country and
there are situations (e.g., where the foreign capital achieves a certain type of monopoly
position) where the costs may even be greater than the contribution of the capital to
gross domestic product.
51 In some empirical studies of savings it has been hypothesized that the
major determinant of the savings rate is tha distribution of income between labor and
capital, the implication being that it does not matter much whether capital income
accrues to corporations or to individuals. If this were the case there would be no need
to distinguish whether an increasing capital share leads to a more unequal distribution
of personal income or to a greater share of private sector income going to corporations.
52 Studies of relevance here are Richard S. Thorn, "The Evolution of Public
Finance during Economic Development", 1\/.ianchester School of Economic and Social
Studies 35, No. 1, January 1967; Harley Hinrichs, A General Theory of Tax Structure
Change During Economic uevelopment, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law School, 1966;
Richard A. i\!lusgrave, Fiscal Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969.

--41Since governments unquestionably do have savings potential in one sense,

it could be argued that the weakness and lack of independence of the government
in a system marked by inequality constitutes a loss of that potential.
Many other determinants

of the income distribution-savings relation would

have to be introduced for a full treatment.

For example, a system with a small

upper class and corresponding unequal distribution of income is more likely to
have a monopolistic (industrial) structure, partly because the reduced number of
potential entrepreneurs decreases the likelihood of competition, and partly because
government policy is more likely to favor large firms (against small or medium sized
The existence of a monopolistic structure ma~

ones) when power is concentrated.

lead to a higher savings rate by generating a higher capital share than would have
Some theorists (e.g., Schumpeter) have also

characterized pure competition.

argued that it creates a greater tendency to innovate, but this is unclear;
monopolistic firms frequently give evidence (in many underdeveloped countries)
of being sluggish and inefficient, and relatively unconcerned with innovation.
P,,ssibly a monopolistic structure has positive effects in a production oriented
society or possibly the effects of monopoly in this regard are positive as long
as the position is not too secure.
Empirical Evidence on the Savings Function
In the discussion of the overall relation between savings and demographic
variables.

two .ties

have been singled out

.is .Df

special importance., the

direct effect of _family size on family savings, and the impact of ·.the .probably greater

income inequality resulting from fast population growth on the average savings
ratio.

In this section empirical evidence bearing on each of these relations is

summarized; this evidence comes from cross country studies, family budget surveys,
and one country-overtime studies.

Unfortunately, all of these have severe

limitations. Comparisons among countries at different income levels, family
budget surveys, and studies of savings functions or savings rates over time in
a given country suffer

from the basic difficulty of the multicollinearity of
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the hypothesized independent variable with so many other variables which might
plausibly be argued to affect savings so as to make a reasonably accurate
specification of the ft:?1.ctienextremely difficult, and leave the ever present
worry that correlation implies little or nothing about causation i.e. that the
higher savings ratio that goes with a higher income level may be due to some other
factor correlated with income.

Since high income may result from a high

propensity to save, it would in any case be difficult to specify the direction
of causation, if the variables were causally related.

In general, regardless of

the variables missing in the specification of the savings function, it seems
probable that both cross country studies and budget surveys tend to overestimate
the marginal propensity to save.
Explanations of why savings rates differ across countries may be more
or less grouped around three basic determining factors-the level of income, the
age structure ( with associated dependency ratios, etc.) and the rate of return
to investment (or "investment opportunities" or some other variant).

The by now

conventional "income li;vel'-' explanations tend implicitly to interpret savings
. as a residual after consumption, and to assume that the desired or "institution
alized" consumption level rises less than proportionately with the income level.
The dependency theories, which relate savings behavior to the age structure
of the population, have hypothesized both positive and negative savings effects
of population growth.

Cassel early suggested that a growing population would

have a higher savings rate than a stationary one since it would have a higher
ratio of the young (i.e., savers) to the older (i.e., dissavers); he was employing
a life cycle theory of savings behavior.

1

An obvious doubt attaching to this

explanation gives rise to the opposite predictions: although the younger age
groups are savers and the older ones dissavers, the former may save less the
larger their families (i.e., the faster the growth of population).

1
Gustav Cassel, The Theory of Social Economy, trans. from 5th edition (New York,

1932).

-43The argument that dependency lowers the savings rate has been most
recently presented and supported with cross country evideace by Nathaniel
Leff.

1

Leff's cross country regressions (on 74 countries) suggested s strong

relation between the dependency ratio and the savings rate, and greater explanatory
power for that variable than for the income level.

While Leff's results did

not imply that income per capita is not a relevant variable in the determination
of savings

1

2

they raised important questions about the nature of that relationship.

Nathaniel E. Leff, "Dependency Rates and Savings Rates", The American Economic
Review, December 1969, p. 86. Leff notes that Eizenga and){odigliani's work
bas··also· supported a connection between dependency rates ;ind· ~avings; ··

2

Prior work on this relation had, of course, tended to indicate a fairly strong
positive tie as well. A strong positive relationship exists if the LDC's
are grouped together and the developed countries together; Kuznets estimated
an income elasticity of savings of 1.48 between selected but fairly large sets
of those two types of countries. Within the less developed countries the
relationship is clearly positive,

3

For the 47 underdeveloped countries, the implied income elasticity of savings
was in the range of 1. 1 to L 15; it was about 1. 0 for the Wes tern developed
countries where the rate of income growth was more important and the dependency
effect of young children much less important, although still quite significant.
In the regression including all countries the income variable was somewhat
more important, partly due to the presence of the LDC's and partly a spurious
result of the pooling of two samples which, according to the Chow test, came from
different universes (seep. 891).

3
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Multicorr:::~~"-Lio;:,. bc·'.":.~.,;,~en incoce £md the dcpcndE::icy variables naturally raises
uncertainticr. as to th2 confiGence to be placed in these results.

1

The least

that can be said, hcwe-;•.:!r, until Bore completely specified relations cao ·be
tested, is that it is at least as lil·.ely that thise demographic variables are
important caus2l factors in the detr;rrnination of savings rates as that the
income variable is.

1

2

The simple correlation of log (income per c~pita) with the logs of child
dependency, aged-c.cpenclency and overall dependency were -.74,.80,and -.67 respec
tively.

2
One difficulty in in.:crpretation of J~eff 's results lies in his failure to use
adult equivalents o:: coi.si..:rr.er equivalents to rr.-:;asurc population. The "population/
adult equivalent" ratio is highe3t where th-2 c1.ependency ratio (especially the
child dependency ro.tio) is high; tlrns if the popuL1tion were measured in adult
equivalents, inc:8,.,r:c rer "capita" would be raised in high dependency countries vis
a vis low c.e:p-:-T.'.d:.:::::cy c:-i:-s. The natt..r•: of th~ statistical bias resulting from the
use of unadjusted pcpu:ati.on figures is not cl0.ar. 0:1 the one hand, it could lead
to an overestirr.:-i.•~2 of tl,e signific:::nc-2 of the iric-:-:.1e variable as a determinant of
savings and an ur:rhrcstim2te of tl-:e effect of the dependency variables since the
former, clo2n.J.y c0r-:c.1.ated ,;ith t:1c <lc: 1J2ndcnc)' Y".:r-iable, would "pick up" more of the
explanatior, ,,f ,:.:J.~i:r:cr:::".l.c::;:; in sc: ~n[':, r.'.lt.cs th.::m when its variance was correctly
measured (2c1d hc:1c.:~ i.s '.:T.11.l.er). 'i.';1i..s is, in other words, a pu::cly statistical
phenomenon o: :: F1°::'.r:b:'..e ,-,ho,;e c.'.Z'.·J.27:1<::)'7 power mc,y be mis2stimated due to its
multicollin('-:-.r i.~.y ~1i. ~·11 a:icther c;:}11::~:::tory va;:L::ble, and w11ere an upward bias in its
significanc-:: is n::::::lr; ,::::i:.'.2 likely by the arti.cicic:tlly high dispe-::-sion of its values
the high di[,i~c: ::::;ic:1 ,·.c! 1:cs it less lik~ly thi'.lt random noise will erase its estimated
significc::.nce.
Ry this i.nter;:::·:c'.:o.t:i.on, it wo 1].d oc co~-:.cludcd that the failure to work in terms
of adult equ:i_,.-.2lcnts bias2-: down Leff' s estinate;:; of the i:nportance of income. A
high dcp'2r.d<c-::1:::y count:ry really h:is high2r incora2 pe>.Y adult equivalent than do the
others 2t th'.2 s::::~-2 i:. -:''1L·'.l per c;i:,ita lcvcl,so i. t s:·.ould ha·re a higher savings rat10
if j_n fact 2~,vings i,., dependent either on inc.:or._ie pcr capita properly defined cir
factors 2r:3oc:i[!tcd t: r.,rc~,r:Lth. H,)~7 significc>r..t this effect would be is not clear.
But, ther0. co11ld, ors t:1e other h,;::d, L:~ a dc,..,:-,ard bias in the income coefficient of
the savin::;s f.·.-:.ctio l Fhen the po~'ulatlcJE variable is unadjusted. Suppose there is,
in reality, a ;,osit:..·e relations'.l:.i.p bct,;een S/Y and Y/A (incomr; per adult equivalent)
; then tr..e coe:Zfici:i,t of i.ncome \-10ulc be lcTc:-ed "'.)y the fact that the income level
is overe::::timatc d ir. :he lm; depe:_-_ -'.ency count:.::.,,s a::.d unde!'esti:r:'.lted in the high
dependency countries. Thi8 misrr'2asure:rent of the income per capita variable would
not necessarily low:-_:_· the estimc:t::E"d s:;3nific2nce of the income variable, but rather
the size of th:~ coel -:icient. Another query uo1·thy of consideration is the extent to
which th2 e:i-:c -~_':':; of fo:;:cign s&·-rings affect::: the results. It is not intuitively
clear th2t it should ~.ead t:o 2.!:.:- '.. 1.2s ,however. Another difficulty in interpreting
Leff' s rcsul ts lies :f_,:,_ kncuing ti:, extent to v;:lich depend·:::ncy ratios are strictly
a function of ::.ncom'~. Before bc~_,-:g in a position ::o quar,tify well the possible
impact of depc:,denc=.; ratic.=. on f;r0wth t,:rou[)1 savings, on:: would have to consider
the above issu,s, 2-r.·: also to ir.::lude invest,.:,-:-nt in human capite.l as a form of
savings. Prob:~bly :_:,':! ratio "iE,-,:,stmen'.: in h1::·1an c::-,pital/investment in physical
capital" would be hi: 11er in com:.t:>.:ies :1ith hi::;;1 de1,cndency ratios, and the overall
In a country like Colombia
impact of the <leper.: -:,cy F,tio Fould t'.1'.ls ar?·.:ar K.o.ller.
(as of E''.::6), the cited ratio ar,v;areC: ::o br, in tt::: neighborhood of 25 to 30 per cent.
0

1
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The tautological equivalence of savings and investment implies that any theory
which claims to be explaining cross country differences in savings rates may in fact
be explaining cross country differences in investment rates.

The "investment

opportunities" theories of savings nay be interpreted in this sense; they suggest
in varying degrees according to the author that in fact savings are relatively elastic
vis a vis the rate of return.

Theodore Schultz, while noting that traditional

economies are likely to be efficient in an allocative sense, argues that growth does
not occur because the new investment opportunities are limited. 1

Arthur Lewis

2

might also fit in this category; he implies that when modern sector investment
opportunities are perceived, the savings are generated out of profits in a rather
straight forward, unequivocal way.

Hirschman's argument that investment opportunities

generate their own savings is clearly of this ilk 3 , and the whole "two gap" dis
cussion of recent times has essentially suggested that savings either will not
occur or will not be productive (and the latter may well in part imply the former)
unless they can be coupled with imports of capital goods-in other words the
possibility of importing is a requisite for a high rate of return to capital. 4
The implication of this last interpretation of overall savings behaviour
for the impact of demographic variables on savings is of interest.

The gist

of the emphasis placed by Alvin Hansen and others on the importance of population
growth in stimulating recovery from the great depression in the U.S.A. was that
it implied certain minimum demands by new families for housing, consumer durables,
etc.; it therefore buoyed aggregate demand.

Since underdeveloped economies

are not normally Keynesian in any general sense, such an argument cannot be
applied directly (see below).

But an interesting related question does arise

as to whether population growth might be associated with "investment opportUI].ities;"

1

2

Theodore Schuil:tz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1966.

Arthur Lewis, "Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," The Manchester School,
/lay, 1954
Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, Yale Universit~
Press, 1958
4
e.g.iHollis Cheu.er~ and Alan StrouJ:""Foreign Assistance and Economic Development,"
.A.mer can t;conomic l'i.ev1ew,
::;ept . .l.~ov.
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this could occur if, for whatever reasons,.greater growth in total income and
smaller growth in per capita income - the presumed concomitants of such
population growth - implied better opportunities for investors.

This question

might provoke the following hypothesis: at income levels where much (or even the
majority of) speculative consumption is met by own production and relatively small
amounts by purchase, an increase in total income which does not correspond to an
increase in per capita income is \lillik~ly to:,ch~ngeieither!"the·-tota-!,-quantity or·.the
composition

of goods demanded in the market as much as the same increase in

income per capita; this latter should permit more division of labor, and more
threshold breaking investment opportunities.
At higher income levels, where most goods are in any case purchased in the
market, slow population growth and rapid growth of income per capita might prevent
the achievement of certain economies of scale in mass markets by implying small
increases in demand for many products rather than large increases in demand
for a few; then the argument would go in the opposite direction.
Intra-country savings studies also shed some limited light on the issues
at hand, though their precise implications for the issue under discussion are
frequently less than obvious and sometimes non-existant.

The question to be

answered is "If policy could affect the rate of population growth (presumably
by affecting the birth rate) without changing any other economic variables, what
would be the impact on the subsequent path of income per capita and the distribution
of income?"

It can only be given a convincing test when a very complete under

standing of an economic system permits

an

accurate specification of that system.

For example, the parar:1eters of a consumption function based on a budget survey
would only be directly applicable to the prediction of the over time implications
for savings of increased income inequality due to population growth.

It could

be assumed (a) that the aggregate consumption function would remain unchanged over
time; this would probably require that those of specific income groups also remain
unchanged, (b)tr.at tl:e survey estim::ited function would be thought of as a "long

-:.;-

run" function i.e., it did not suffer fron biases related to transitory income1 and
(c) that the specification of the consumption function was correct; of particular
interest in this connection would be the correct specification of relevant demographic
variables--if in fact these variables are important in the cross country savings
function then they must also be incorporated in any single country function which
purports to predict savings under different demographic conditions from those cur
rently prevailing.

As discussed earlier, a family savings function does not des

cribe total savings behavior, uniess (through indirect process) total savings were
to depend on total income in the
depend on family income.

2

· same way as family savings

That all these conditions be satisfied is unlikely.

There is probably little doubt that budget studies overstate the positive
relationship between the savings rate and income; there remains the question of
whether there is a long run positive relation between the two; if there is not
then the long run marginal propensity to save is also unrelated to income--this
is the relation of relevance in the present discussion.
Over time studies for individual countries have, as is well known, frequently
shown constant savings rates or fluctuations without trend. 3 The complexities involved in reconciling budget studies of savings with over time studies suggest
caution in facile interpretations of the applicability of citber type of "savings
function. 114 It is clear for various reasons, that one cannot predict the future
average·savings rate on the basis of a budget study.

Variables which provide a

statistical recot1ciliation of "over time" and "moment of time" studies include
wealth levels, transitional income, distribution of income by size of locality,
new products and the relative income hypothesis, etc. All of these interpretations
tend to be consistent with
1
0£ the type discussed by Milton Friedman in his A Theory of the Consumption Function,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.
2
Although improbable, this is not impossible, since other forms of savings are
likely to be substitute for family savings. See the discussion on p • •
3
As in theU. s.
4Friend made interesting observations on the joint use of time series and cross-section
data. See Irwin Friend, 11Techniques of Projecting Saving," Chapter in National Council
of Applied Economic Research, Heasurement and Analysis of ~aving, papers of a seminar
held in December 1960 (New Delhi 1962), p. 98.

the evic!ence, i.e. little statistical evii!ence l-ielrinr- tc rule out some
of them seens yet to have been provi<le<l,
designed to reconcile increasinc:

/I.PS

Those develoued country theories

in budget studies with constant APS

over tine are not directly relevant to _the situation of the LDC' s since

(a) their APS's flo tend to be belou that of the DC's, so, if it be hyno

thesized that both r:rour,s co!J.e fros the sane univc::rse (in a broa'.! sense)

then it must be allowed that APS can rise in the LDC's and (b) an increase
in APS bas been observed in a s~all nu~ber of L~C's over a verioJ suffi~

ciently long as to arpu~ th:1t it was not a Durely transitory Dheno!'lenon.
Only if all of the Dositive relationshins betueen avera?e 11ropensi ty to save and incone ~wre due to the hi<?h ~1ar:dnal nrorensi ty to
save out of transitory in cone ,rnuld one ~1e verv -c:-essinis tic al:iout the lonP

run rossibilities of raisin~ the avero.se savinvs rate,

1

like the relative inco~e hy~othesis there is obviously a stron° nressure
ar,ainst larc,:e and lonr, sustainec.~ increases in the 2vera1~e savin1~s ratio,

but one ni~h t su!)nose sone rip;idi ty in consurmtion na tterns.

Overall it

seeI!lS not ir.1".)lausible to assume a !'OSitively slo!)ec1 )Jerri.anent savinr:s

function.

11
This could be based on a r!esire to bequest or a "resiclual

attitude to savinps.

This function say l;e assune·} to shi f't over tine in

response to nany different factors.

1

The "lons run" in this instance is defined by hov lonr> it takes lnditirl
uals to recefine unexryected incoM.e increases as nart of their nemanent inIn the ,:,ure versions of life cycle sav.in"S theorv -- i.e., \•here
come.
there is no ures1.1r>ed desire for becuest, the increRse cannot be lon~ run.
~Jhere such a bequest is ;,resent, an~ has an incoEe elastic cleMann, then the
()then-rise any 'IITise
savings ratio ri.ay 1-:Je exnecter to rise in the lonn: run,
which l•!Ould occur -- an<l one would be ex")ecte-:1. durinfY the '.1rocess of neonles'
becor.dn!>, conscious of their nen hiITher nem.anent inco~es, an<l esrieclally
r;iven the fact that the inco!')e accrues disnronortionately to r,eonle in the
savinr•s stac-es of their lives -- PouL1 be a:-tran:Sitory in·creas~ ih':'the -·Aver'!lP:e
r,roryensity.

It see:7.c. not iTIJ.rirobal·,le, for exa!"ple, even thoug11 averap-e savings
rates do not chanf!e over time, that the point of tir:,.e savinf!s functions does

involve a nositive relation between ,·ernanent s'.lvino-r.: rate and rierrv:ment
income, with a?,e, etc. helc constant.
There is nothinp: in the ero:nirical evidence, to nv knowledr:e, Phich
would contradict either the hvnothesis that a svstem uith a ryeIT'..anentlv
more: unequal distrH·ution would "enerate higher savirn•s rate on average,
through ti!'.".e, or that it woul,J n-enerate a loner one,

The issue, in short,

of whether a redistribution of inco!'.;e related. to cl-iang!iW derioo-rarhic var
iables uould tend to increase or decrease savinr,s is ~uite unresolve<l.

The

evi~ence on the nar?inal rate of savinrs <cenerated fron budn:et studies is
~resumahly of sane relevance to the issue; a hudr>et study

~~s

Hhicl-i is

stron~ly increasin~ Dresu,Jablv if"'.':lies a r:reater likelihoor that t!te "nerlT!
anent savinr,s function" has t!iat characteristic than an ''"PS uhich is rlecreas
inl'.'; but that is about .:ill that can re said,

1

3u:Jret stu~ies inv.:1ri.'l1'lv in:hcate t!,at the savinr-s rat<= is a nositive functi•:)n of far-1ily income,

2

t,lthou?h the evirlence naturally varies

1

If some information of an C."'!nirical sort were a•.railable on the relative
r:iar,nitude of transitory and nermanent incul'le, one coul,1 test the sensitivity
of the "nernanent" savin~s function and the observe,! one but I am not aware
of such an analysis havinr:; been nerforP1ed,
2

Cline (op.cit.), usin~ observations which 1.1ere :iverages for income c?.te~or
ies, observed very hiqh ~ar~inal r'ronensities in the linear esti~atin£ e~ua
tion (C=a+bY, where C is conSU!')r'tion anr: Y is incoM.e), ranp.in~ fror:1 • 29 to
• 49. (See P, 56)
In three of the four countrie'3 Olrazil, A.rrrentina an<l
M:exico) !le found a sirnificant curvtlinear character to the ftmction, i.e.,
the T!larrdnal savinr:s rate di(1 rise Fi th increasinf'" incor.ic; in ~Jenezuela
this tendency was not Pinificant.
In Inclia Vrien<l (Irwin l~riend, chanter
on "The Pronensity to Save in Incli a" in Econonic nevelopnen t Issues -Dr -P.S. Lokanathan Seventy-Seconc! 3irthna" Conr,,enoration VoluMe (Uora and
Co., Bombay, 1966) used cross-section data and found an all Inclia HPS out
of nornal personal disnosable incorae of arouncl O.167.
Chaudhry used tir.1e
series data and found an ·-.-ps out of total incoT'l.e of Cl .1244 and an ~rr-s out
of ner capita incone of O. 2259 [lha natta "OY C!tou<lhury, "Incone, Consu!'lD
tion and Savin3 in Urhan anJ ;:>ural India" in Pevieu of IncoT"l'le and TJealth,
Series 14, No. 1, ''arch 1968. J
One of the r,1os t co'."'\nlete sur,reys of savings
infornation in across :~evelorinr'. countries apnears to be that of n Tun Fai.
[U Tun Hai, "Pinancial Interr,ediatinn and national Savinfl's in Develoninc:>
Countries," Economic r:rowth Center Jliscussion r>a'1er :-l'0. 126, Aufust 1971. J
His over ti!'le regressions incHcate,1 "PS norrmllv ahove ,\'f'S in both DC' s
(continued on next nage)
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from country to country, it is tv11ic?.l to find the botto!'"l fe~-r deciles
enr,aged in net dissaving while the tor, c1ecile (earnin?, sav, 35-507 of
income) has a savings rate of, say, 10-20% and the ton 5% a savinP:S rate
of 15-25%.

Biases in the dat2. r:iav ~!ell be substantial, though it is not

clear in which direction they run.

There is likely to be rreater under-

estir.iation of hi[!:h incomes than of the consunntion expenditures corresponding ·to then.

But low incoI!le savinf>s are also likelv to be underes til'l-

ated, especially in tracitional econo~ies.

1

2

(cont'd. frot'.l r-revious page) an-:1 Li1C' s, 1.ri th :-:e.:~ical values of 1 ~S in
the same ranse in both cases of aroun,1 O. 4; the variance ~ms !'.luch hi~l-ter
anonr, the LDC's, fron -,3 in !kuador (r-,rot.ably reflectil!l.t, nro'blerns in
the national accounts) to 0,9 in ~ana~a (n~obably sufferins fro~ the same
Since avera".e propensities tenr1 to be lo'.;er in the less develr,roble'!!).
ooe<l countries, the difference bet,1een ~arrdnal and avereP:e tended to 11e
(Tun nai used linear e~uations, includefl a time trend
sol'leHhat hi9:her.
in all the equations and variables for ,.,rice chan?e, real interest, and rate
of grOl',th of real rier card.ta incone in various of his alternatives; inclu
sion or exclusion of the last three variables had so!'le but nor!'lallv not
The savino:s vad.a1'le uas total r:ross
dramatic effects on the results.
is !7ross national nroduct oer canvariable
income
the
and
national savin;:>:s
national accounts are sonefrori
deriver!
rates
savings
Household
ita.)
(The
thou1>h not aluavs.
studies,
bu,~r:et
in
if".1.Dlicit
those
tioes belou
the
in
ir.ir:--licit
error
,_1ossihle
11i~h
the
fror,
course,
of
suffer,
former
TJai
Tun
sa.vinp-s.
such
estinate
to
used
usually
methodology
residual
found that over the period 1950-65 (rouTThly), all'lost half of the LUC's had
In two-thirds of the LDC's
household savinss rates of less than 5 percent.
the personal savings ratio has either fallen or renained almost unchanged
'·'eanwhile
over the period; in one-thirc, sir,nificant increases occurred.
half of the DC's had savinr,s rates ahove 12.5.
1rhus Panikcr estiJT}ate,1 that around 1950-51 the Drol)ortion of savinqs oc
lle ar(!uec1. that the
curring in kind in rural Incl.ia uas about 40 nercent.
tyoical savings of the S8all T'OOr Indian farl:!ers uas considerably hi,,.her
than might have been exnected -- the net sa~rino:s rate could easily he
10 cercent, 16 percent, or even hi~her over a several yea~ averaRe (the
rates beinf ~uite volatile accordion to the situation of a ~iven year).
(See P,G.K. Panikar, "?ural Savinp:s in India," Econonic DeveloT'l'lent and Cul
tural Chan~e, October 1961.
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Regardless of the general agreement that the marginal savings propensity estimated in
a budget survey is above the corresponding parameter of a peroanent savings function,
few would disagree with the hypothesis that it is positive, though conceivably not
very large.

1

Intra-country studies of the direct effects of family size on the savings rate

2

are less helpful than the cross country studies, to date at least, in part due to the

1

Reasons to expect it to be positive include the facts that (a) some people are
involved in a continuous upward adjustment of expected lifetioe incomes, and others are
not or are adjusting to downward change, and due to habit foroation in consumption
patterns, the former group, who may be expected to have higher average income than the
latter, have higher savings rates; they also have higher savings rates at given income
levels; (b) there are real constraints against people havine highly different consump
tion expenditures, based on economies of scale in production and distribution of par
ticular types of goods, working against the provision of relatively low cost goods for
people at either end of the income distribution; (c) the rate of return to capital is
higher for hi8h income people, and present and future consumption levels (or bequests)
are substitutible.
2

Family savings appear to provide a rather small share of total savings in some
LDC; so demographic effects here might be argued to be of less than overwhelming impor
tance. But data for less developed countries in Asia show that households account for
half or more of gross domestic savines--in some countries as much as two-thirds. About
one-half of these are in the form of tangible assets, much nore than in developed
countries. Business savings were between one-eighth and one-quarter and governnent savings
between 20 and 40 percent of gross domestic savines for these countries. In many nations
of Latin America business savings account for up to half or ~ore of gross domestic savings.
With respect to the share of govert1I!lent in total savings the developed countries
are much more homogeneous, with over half of thel!l in the 25-35 percent range, while
for the developing countries 41 percent had less than 15 percent and 26 percent more
_than 55 percent. Twenty percent (or seven countries)had less than 5 nercent. (Gavin W.
Jones, The Economic Effect of Declining Fertility in Less Developed Countries, an
occas:fonR.l panP,:- of the Pot>ulPt:1.on Coundl, Feb. 1969, p. 11.)
-·-
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difficulties of and failure to sort out incooe and demographic variables. Large
family size implies directly a lower average incooe per capita and per adult equivalent;
unless this factor is taken into account explicitly'in a budget study, the results will
3
be difficult to interpret.

The locical hypothesis is that savings decrease for a

given family income or adult income per capita the larger the family size, because
certain consumption expenditures almost inevitably increase. But there has been
relatively little empirical testing of this hypothesis.

4

Studies from LDC's do

suggest negative relations between faoily size and the savings ratio, with family
income held constant.

A study of oiddle income workers in Nairobi found higher savings

rates for smaller families, which had, on average, somewhat smaller incomes. (see
Kenya Ministry of Economic Planning and Develop-

:,

If family income is t4e inc0t1e variable, fal!lily size cou10- in,..- -r _ _,,.....,,
which correspond to income; income might provide a fully satisfactory explanation for
savings, with der:lographic factors entering only in their role as direct dete~nants of
per capita income variables. Probably a simpler-though not perfect-methodology is that
which separates, as independent variables, income per adult assuming no children and
number of children.
4

One study, based on U.S. data, showed some relation between family size and savings
rates, though the results were difficult to interpret. (See w. Eizzenga, Demographic
Factors and Savings, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1961.)
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ment, Statistics nivision, Statistical Abstract, 1969).

The results are

not unambiguous, however, since a7e and sex structure of families were not
given, so it is not possible to normalize satisfactorily for the income
variable.

Colombi;:,.n data show the same relation but are likewise not pre-

sented in a forI'l uhich pemi ts apryropriate normalization of the income
(and other) variables.

(See ~afael Prieto, 09. cit.)

Observed narginal Dropensities to save tend to fall in the ranr,e of

0.15 to 0,60 (See Tun Hai, op.cit.)

Gross avera9.e national savinps almost

all lie between 10 and 20 in LDC's (See Tun TJai, n. 118).
Summary

It may be useful here to·recnitulate the arPurnents discussed so far.
The impact of denorraphic variahles on outnut Has felt to de~en<l orirnarily
on return to scale and other c~aracteristics pf the nroduction function and
The hypothes;'..s that larl">e family size h.'.1s a ne7ative direct

on savin('.s.

effect on savin~s ap~ears to be More or less borne out in the studies re£erred to.

The second relsvant issue, the indirect impact on savin°s of

a chanJed der:ree of incone ineauality is clarified much less by emnirical

work; the luck of any persuasive evidence that the relevant ".,ermanent"
savings function denoast~ates increasin~ mar~inal propensity to save argues
for the coaclusica tha= the income re<listribution effect on savin~s is not
very larpe.

Since most of the other effects are likely to be ne~ative,

the probable 07erall effect seems clearly to be nenative.
The impact on distribution, despite considerable aMbi,mity as
to some of the component effects, seens very prob'lbly to be ne~ative.

It

depends, ss <liscussed ea=lier, en how capital is redistributed over time
-and on the elasticity of substitution between labor and ca;-it:11, and on sav-

inp:s behavior,.

O~e of the most f-)lausihle sets of assunntions, i.e.,

(a) an elasticity of fa::tor suhstitution not far fror.1 one -- and certainly

-54not much above one -- so that a substantial decrease in the equilibrium
wage rate and an increase in the rate of return to capital may be antic
i~ated to result from a lar~er nopulation anJ (b) a perm~nent ~verage pro
nensity to save which increases with inc::ome (even if the mar?-:inal prorien
sity does not), implies that short and lon~er run effects of the oonulation
rrowth work to,rether to provic.e a stronr:: disequalizin;, force.

1

The savings -- and hence the future capital stock -- of peonle

toward the bottom of the dis trihution are lowered by the chanf':e in the
wage/rental ratio, while those of hi~her incof'.le people 1.re raised; this
effect is stroni?er the preater the riositive relation between avera~e savines

2 3
rates and income levels. •
Effects of Ponulation Growth on Income Per C.'.1-:,ita Paths TJhen the Alterna
tives Are A Constant Pooulation Crowth Over Time and a Decrease in Growth
Over Time
The demor>raphic policy decision uhich nav face an individual country
is not the one analyzed above (e.g. a choice between, say, a 31.'. nonulation
t".rowth over past, present and future and a 0% over past, present an-:l fu
ture), but rather a choice between 3%, nresen t and future as 01)nosed to

3% · past and ryresent but a o:>ra<lual (or quick) lowerin"' in the future.

The

two comparisons are quite different, since a country's are structure de
pends on the past as well as the current rate of rionulation growth.

Hhen

1

rf to this is added the conclusion of some e~virical studies that the rate
of return to capital is hirher for richer ueople than for poorer oeople,
the case becomes even stronger, e.i>., James E. Heade, Efficiency, Equity,
and the Ownership of Capital, London, Geor~e Allen and Un-win, 1964.

2

These various relations are treated jointly in an interestin?. model of the
interaction between the demo~raphic an<l economic charncteristics of differ!Iermany Daly, "A T:arxian-Halthusian
ent classes outlined by Herman Daly.
''iew of Poverty and Exploitation ,,ith a Correspondinp Tynolo•,y of Social
Classes," Economic Growth Center Discussion Paner 80, !fovember 1969.
3

Rer;ardless of the much more difficult ~uestion of how r.1P.r"'inal propensity
to save changes with income levels, there see~s less doubt (see above) that
average rates do rise.
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birth and death rates are stable over a considerable neriorl, a~e composi
tion also stabilizes; it is then r,articularly meaninrful to talk of over

time changes in income per capita, etc., since that variable chan~es in
the same de~ree as such more Jirectly mcanin~ful variables as income per

adult equivalent, avera~e fanily income, etc.

1

Hhen the rate of ponulation ::r<Yll'th is chanr>int:;, careful attention

must be r,iven to the il:lPlications of the laf' between the birth of a child
an<l his entrance into the labor force, a lal"T which ran<.>es betueen 10 and

20 years accordin? to the system in question,

It implies that, <lurin~

the first 10 to 20 years after n fall in. the rate of ponulation ~rowth
(assuminP. that the fall is due lar,.,ely or wholly to chano:es either in
fertility or infant mortality rates

not too far from t~e truth in

most LDC's -- there iG no short n:n effect on the rate of <>rout!1

1

comparisons beb,ecn tuo different syste~s with r,opul.::ition ":rowin~ at con
stant but different r~~2~ ca~ be d2n?-ero~s since the different rates imply•
'i'he ratio of the avera~e infor example, differer:.'.: child/a(]dt ratios,
come per caDi ta fipur:?s T.Jould thus be clifferen t from the ratio of the
~ut at least over time, chan~es in income
averare family inco~e fi~~~es.
per person would be r2levant neascr-:s of ch.s.nnes in the relative develop
ment of the n-10 econo~ies.
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of the labor force, i.e., a slowdmm of nopulati on qroi.th does not affect
the rate of p,rowth of output durinf'. this perior1 throufh the mechanis m of
a smaller labor force (thou~h, of course, it may throuo,h other mechanis ms),
The seconJ it:2,)orta nt implicat ion of the fact that the a~e structur e
and the dependen cy ratio chan~e durinr, this transitio n period is, as sur,
gested above, that the concept of income ~er capita is a dubious one by
which to measure economic success.

Its uniform

validity requires the

assumpti on that the same level of income is required for an indivi<l ual to
achieve a certain level of satisfac tion, re~arJle ss of his a~e, re~ardle ss
of how individu als are orranize d into families ., etc.

In fact, it is

obvious that a child of one year old consunes less than

atl

adult; there

may also be economie s of scale in housim' and certain other expendi tures
(e. g,, the cost of six peovle vho live under one roof and achieve a given
level of satisfac tion per person ~ay be less than SOZ hi~her than the cost
for four).
11

Both of these factors su 0 vest the neerl to use the concer,t of

consumed equivale nt" in this analysis .
The implicat ions of addin'3 these

wo

transitio n period consider a

tions to the prior discussi on can be seen easily in the context of the
"benchm ark" set of assum?ti ons used above (linear homo~en eous producti on
function , savings rate independ ent of populati on o;rowth an<l no technolo gical
chan~e).

In the comparis on between Drn constant ,Ufferen t populati on

growth rates, it was observed that a system r,ith ~onulati on s,.rowth Z%
lower would experien ce a r,rowth of ner capita incoflle less than Z% ~reater;
with the ~resent assumpti on of indeuen< lence of t'1e r:rowth of the labor
force fron the ~routh of populati on, a no1)ulati on ,,.roe-1th louer by Z% does
imoly a per capita income 7r0Pth faster by exactly 7 ;,ercent , since both
the capit:il stock and the l'lbor force are r:;rm-1inn- inderyen rlentlv of nopu-

-57lation, and the only difference between the two cases is the number of people
among whom the total income is to be distributed.

In other words, the disadvan

tage of population growth seems to become greater with the addition of this
realistic assumption.

But allowance for the fact that the ratio "consumer equi

valents/population" is lower in the faster growing population partially offsets
this feature; the difference between the two rates of growth of income per con
sumer equivalent is less than the difference between the two rates of growth
of per

person income.

The importance of this latter consideration de-

pends on the weights applied to people of different ages in calculating consumer
equivalents.

If, to take an arbitrary example, the "adult equivalent" coefficient

for children of one year old was .1, that for children of two years old .2,
and so on up to 10 at which they were assumed to be adults, then a sudden
drop in population growth rate from 3% to 0% would in the first year after the
change imply a rate of growth of income per adult equivalent only a little over
0.3% higher than it would have been with no change in population growth (instead
of the full 3% increase in the growth rate of income per capita)~

and in the

l

The percent of total population which is in the age group 0-1 when
population is growing at 3% is 3+x, where x is the percent of the year-·
end population which died during the year (perhaps between one and two per
cent}. If Xis the absolute number who died, then
X

X
= --

pJ

where P is the year-end population in the system growing at 3% per year. If
3
we assume the only source of the difference in the growth rates of the two popu
lations is their birth and infant mortality (less than one year} death rates,
then the per cent of total population in the age group 0-1 in the system with
no growth is
or (lpOJ)X = 1.03x
X
3
po
The per cent of all adult equivalents in the 0-1 age range depends on length
of life and the weightings of different age groups. If x = .01 this per cent
would be about 0.48. For the population whose growth just dropped to 0% it
would be about 0.12. Thus since the growth rate of adult equivalentsdiffers
only by about .036 between the two cases, so does the growth rate of income
per adult equivalent.

-58second year of a little over 0.6%; hy the 10th year the adult equivalent
1
Around this
~rowth rates are different Ly the full 37, or a little more.
time or soon thereafter, the labor forces of the two systef!ls be<>in to <liffer
so the difference in the rate of ':!rowth of income per adult eriuive.lent will
soon be nushed belov 3% a~•ain.
short run.

This issue can be an i~~ortant one in the

2

Demographic and Econo"lic Variables in a Keynesian Syster.i
Perhans the only two very serious arquments Phich have ever been
put fori:rar<l in favor of po•:mlntion nro•-1th are (1) the increasinr returns to
scale ar<:>ument already referred to, which. l"1ay !:le of scT!\e v,,tlic1ity in a small
econorw which faces severe barriers to internation al tr.:1de and as a result

cannot take full advantase of snecializati on t'hrou~h traJe, and (2) the arp.;ument that in an economy sufferin" fro~ a lack of a''.Pre,ate <leoand, n '."'rowinf

1

Since a sudden chan°e in <>rowth rate fro-ri 3 to O creates a su'1den discontinuity in the number of neor,le in contir•uous i!CTe cohorts, be'"!innin,• about 10
years hence there ,·!ill be a period when the ::i½solute nur.iber of consumer e<1ui
valents falls briefly; it •.Till then oscillate before reA.chin('. its final level.
that correspondim ~ to .'.! zero r,or.mlation 1:rm1th and the 0 iven death rates 1
2
some information is available to nrovi<le n bA.sis for estimatin~ these conIf one is ~rillino to assuMe that ntthin n f.:imilv·,. food,
sumer eauivalents .
clothinz and so on .'.!re distributed so as ~ore or less to eau3te the satisfac
tion of ,;,arents and children, relative anounts consuJT1ecl then constitute an inIt annears fro~ some emnirical
terestin7 measure of consur.ier equivalents .
studies that the "adult equivalent" of children is not as 10,1 as one mi~t
think, at least after the first two or three years; children around 10 to 15,
for examnle, tend to consu!'le more food than adults an<l they are frequently
In defin
receivin?. education •rhose 1Jrivate and nuhlic cost can loom larro;e.
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should
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-59populati on may sti~ulat e a multinl ier effect, via the creation of a hi?her
demand for new housinf and other b2.sic itey,,.s uhose demand is More a function
of populati on e,rowth rates than ponulati on size.

The demand for i terns like

housin~ (lon~ life) reflects the accelera tor nrincipl e, i.e., a s~all nercent
increase in the demanrl for the service rrovided by the n:oorl leads to a much
larger increase in demand for its uroducti on.

In a situatio n of insuffi-

cient a3~reo,a te demand, the acceler ator-nu lti~lier interact ion can be a
oowerfu l mechanis n.

This are:umen t can be especia lly valic'. if, as is likely

to be the case uith housinn, the increase d denand associat ed with faster
po!)ulati on qrowth imolies a. lar:7e increase in ex ante invest1'1. ent minus ex
ante s avin :-s •

Althouo:1:. new families acquirin< ; houses 3re likely to try

smaller~
to increase their savin~•s rates, this increase is likely to be !!luch
at least in the first fe~J years,. t1:lan the investMe nt involved .
The strenr_,th of this possible positive effect of populati on °rowth
on incone would denend on the amount of investMe nt demand ~enerate d, and
the smallnes s of nny associ:1t e,~ increase in ex a.11.te savi...-1Fs,
course, as on the multipl ier.

<'.:!S

,·!ell, of

The !'lain forms of inves t~ent uould ;1resurn--

ably be housinr,;, certain tynes of soci"l infrastr ucture such as roads anri
educatio n vhere requirem ents ten:i to be a function of nonulati on.
further specific ation of the producti on ))rocess and of the relative unem
ploy!'len t of various factors in the underel'lp loyment e0_uilibr ium, it \·TOuld

be possible also to determin e the inpact of the nonulati on r>:rowth on dis
tributio n of income alon!"' with th.at on out1:ut and eml)loym ent.
Economic and Deno~ra nhic Factors in a Labor Surf'lus Hodel
It seems :nrob:'lbl e, intuitiv ely, that the ne•,ative effects of poou
1
lation ~rov,1th will be stronn:e st in a labor surl)lus situatio n, more St.'ec-

1This has been pointed out, ;:imow• other, by ?icharcl Easterli n, op.cit.
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ifically , in that labor surplus case uhere '~L = n,

1

since of the two usual

effects of Donulati on rrowth (i.e., increase in outr>ut and increase in the
number of neople amonp, whom that output or income is divided) the ~ositive
one is reooved; a oopulati on increase rener2te s no increase in output, even
in the long run.

Other thinr>,s beinr equal, the relation betveen averaP;e

per cauita income and populati on size is a nrecise one; nith x% more people,
income per ca~ita is x% lo•-1 er.
The case of fixed proporti ons between labor and canital (analyze d
above) is one examDle of a labor surnlus situatio n; other cases are outlined
in the extensiv e literatu re on the labor surrlus economy.

The reasons for

the presence of labor surplus do not concern us here; it seeMs r>robahle
that some such phenonen on does exist in nany countrie s.
~'ith

1

.-PL = 0 the conr!itio ns which in t'he context of the neoclas sical

model iroply a nositive effect of hi'"'.her ,:,orulati on on i!'lco"'e r-er C'.lDita no
lon2er do so; the existenc e of increasi nr, returns to sc2.le is "irrelev ant;"

2

- TPL

and by the cefiniti on of lahor surr-lus, a rise in !'PK as L rises could not
easily lead to an iTI~roved distribu tion.

3

1

The labor sur;)lus conditio n is usually (~efined hy the existenc e of a sector
it
of the econony in which the income level (or war,.e rate, denendin °- on how
pro
l
marr,ina
that
ivity;
tJroduct
l
!'larr:ina
its
above
is
is viewed) of labor
ductivit y :riay or may not be zero; results for cases where it is nositive
but lou would be less extre!'1e than the ones discusse- :l here.
2

Since takin? advanta~ e of them depends solely on an increase< ! ca!'ital stock
and is not furthere by a larr,er labor force.
3

MPL

orip;ina lly at zero, woulc~ have to increase substan tially before 'WL
would equal wa:;es, since labor surnlus theory nos tulates a wape ,·!ell ahove
Risinp; ?•PL coulc still nush wa~es un, but prohahly less rariidly than
zero.
So a positive inco!'le redistri bution seems al!'!ost
in a neoclas sical settin,,..
1
itll'!)ossi ble as a result of hiP,her uopulati on; t ~e opposite is almost assured.

iiPK
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The only remainin~ issue to be Jiscusse-:1 is the impact of nopulation
growth on the savinSjs rate.

On

the dyna~ic si<le, the same questions as

discussed for the neoclassica l case are relevant here; overall, they make
the result generally indetermina te, thou~h there is an even stron?,er pre
sumption in this case that the effect of nonulation growth on averaP,e incol!le
will be nerative and that distribution will be rmrsenecl.

